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Abstract 
 
R&D policy instruments, such as subsidies and tax incentives, have the objective to increase 
private firms’ R&D investments, and hence the economic performance and competitiveness 
of national innovation systems. Norway, like many other OECD countries, has an active 
R&D policy that aims at increasing the R&D intensity of the economy. The tax-incentive 
scheme SkatteFUNN, active since 2002, is one of the major R&D policy programmes 
supported by the Norwegian Government. 
 
The recent literature on R&D policy evaluation investigates the effects that tax incentive 
schemes have on firms’ innovation efforts, and typically points out the existence of a positive 
impact on companies’ R&D expenditures (input additionality) and technological performance 
(output additionality). However, much less attention has so far been devoted to the study of 
the motivations that drive firms to apply to these R&D programmes, as well as other effects 
that these may have on firms’ strategies and capabilities in a broader sense (so-called 
behavioural additionality). 
 
Another limitation of this literature is that it is mostly represented by quantitative studies that 
focus on the average effect of R&D policy for the whole economy, without paying attention 
to the extent to which these effects differ across firms. Firm heterogeneity is a key conceptual 
pillar in innovation studies, and it is reasonable to expect that the impacts of R&D policy 
vary substantially depending on companies’ capabilities and knowledge base. 
 
Motivated by these gaps in extant literature, this thesis presents a qualitative analysis of the 
Norwegian tax-credit scheme SkatteFUNN, that has the objective to investigate firms’ 
motivations and behavioural additionality effects, and how these differ for different groups of 
firms and in different sectors.  
 
In a comparative case study analysis, I collected interview and survey questionnaire data on 
20 Norwegian firms that have recently received SkatteFUNN support for some of their R&D 
projects. These 20 companies were selected from the population of SkatteFUNN approved 
projects, provided by the Norwegian Research Council, according to three criteria: (i) their 
	  VIII	  
previous experience with R&D (experienced vs. non-experienced firms), (ii) the sectoral 
context in which they operate (high- vs. low-R&D sectors) (iii) their size (large vs. SMEs). 
 
The results indicate that the motivation to apply to SkatteFUNN varies with R&D experience: 
firms with prior experience are more likely to apply in order to reduce the costs of their R&D 
projects or increase their scale, while firms without prior R&D experience are more 
motivated to apply in order to secure necessary funds to initiate new R&D projects. 
Regarding behavioural additionality, the firms with no prior R&D activity were found to 
have experienced the strongest change to their behaviour, since the SkatteFUNN support 
made it possible for them to set up a new technological strategy and hence build up new 
routines and capabilities.   
 
On the whole, the thesis concludes that heterogeneity plays an important role: firms’ 
responses to R&D policy programmes differ substantially, and this dimension should be 
taken into due account when designing and evaluating this type of policy schemes.  
	  	   IX	  
  
	  X	  
Table of contents 
 
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
2 Background ........................................................................................................................ 4 
2.1 Innovation patterns in Norway: historical background ..................................................... 4 
2.2 Industry and innovation policy in Norway ........................................................................... 6 
2.3 The Norwegian tax-incentive program: SkatteFUNN ........................................................ 9 
2.3.1 History and description ...................................................................................................... 9 
2.3.2 Rules and function ........................................................................................................... 10 
2.3.3 SkatteFUNN in numbers ................................................................................................. 13 
2.3.4 Evaluations ...................................................................................................................... 13 
3 Literature review ............................................................................................................. 17 
3.1 Why do we need innovation policy? .................................................................................... 17 
3.1.1 Neo-classical endogenous growth theorising .................................................................. 17 
3.1.2 Evolutionary growth theorising ....................................................................................... 18 
3.2 Rationale for public intervention ........................................................................................ 19 
3.2.1 Market failure .................................................................................................................. 19 
3.2.2 System failure .................................................................................................................. 20 
3.3 Policy instruments ................................................................................................................ 20 
3.3.1 R&D tax-incentives ......................................................................................................... 22 
3.4 Evaluation of R&D policy .................................................................................................... 23 
3.4.1 Measurements .................................................................................................................. 23 
3.4.2 Empirical evidence .......................................................................................................... 25 
4 Literature gaps and hypotheses ...................................................................................... 27 
4.1 Gaps in extant literature ...................................................................................................... 27 
4.2 Knowledge and heterogeneity .............................................................................................. 28 
4.2.1 Dynamic capabilities and corporate learning .................................................................. 32 
4.3 Inter-sectoral heterogeneity ................................................................................................. 35 
4.4 Intra-sectoral heterogeneity ................................................................................................. 37 
4.5 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................................. 39 
5 Data and methodology ..................................................................................................... 42 
5.1 Case study framework .......................................................................................................... 42 
	  	   XI	  
5.2 Sources of data ...................................................................................................................... 43 
5.2.1 Selection of cases ............................................................................................................. 43 
5.2.2 Access to data .................................................................................................................. 45 
5.2.3 Presentation of cases ........................................................................................................ 46 
5.3 Collecting the data ................................................................................................................ 54 
5.3.1 Preparation ....................................................................................................................... 55 
5.3.2 Step 1: Personal interviews .............................................................................................. 56 
5.3.3 Step 2: E-mail survey questionnaire ................................................................................ 59 
5.4 Reliability, validity and ethical concerns ............................................................................ 60 
5.4.1 Validity ............................................................................................................................ 60 
5.4.2 Reliability ........................................................................................................................ 61 
5.4.3 Ethical considerations ...................................................................................................... 62 
5.5 Process of analysis ................................................................................................................ 63 
6 Results ............................................................................................................................... 65 
6.1 Motivation to apply .............................................................................................................. 65 
6.1.1 Experienced R&D performers ......................................................................................... 66 
6.1.2 Non-experienced R&D performers ................................................................................. 68 
6.1.3 Hypothesis test: motivation ............................................................................................. 70 
6.2 Behavioural additionality ..................................................................................................... 71 
6.2.1 Experienced R&D performers ......................................................................................... 72 
6.2.2 Non-experienced R&D performers ................................................................................. 75 
6.2.3 Hypothesis test: behavioural additionality ...................................................................... 77 
6.3 Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 78 
6.3.1 Links between motivation (H1) and behavioural additionality (H2) ............................... 78 
6.3.2 Sectoral heterogeneity ..................................................................................................... 79 
7 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 81 
7.1 Is the SkatteFUNN programme effective? ......................................................................... 83 
7.1.1 Addressing Market and non-market Failures .................................................................. 83 
7.1.2 Increasing Net Social Welfare ......................................................................................... 85 
7.2 Policy Implications ............................................................................................................... 87 
References ............................................................................................................................... 90 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................. i 
 
  
 
	  1	  
1 Introduction 
 
What does a small bakery in Råde, a zoo in Kristiansand, and Norway´s largest producer of 
weapons and ammunition have in common? For one thing, they have all received public 
support for research and development (R&D) through the Norwegian tax-incentive scheme, 
SkatteFUNN. But why did so different companies apply to the scheme, and what effects did 
they experience?  
 
According to the Lisbon agenda, Norway is committed to increase its investment in R&D up 
to 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP), of which 2% is supposed to be private R&D 
expenditures. In the government’s arsenal of R&D policy instruments, the SkatteFUNN 
program is a “catch-all” scheme that is intended to benefit all firms in the economy, 
regardless of their characteristics and sectoral affiliation. It is the largest programme focused 
on stimulating private R&D in Norway, and is responsible for approximately 20% of the total 
funding - paying out nearly NOK 1 400 million (approx. EUR 175 million) in 2013 
(Cappelen et al., 2007; NFR, 2014). 
 
Internationally, the focus on innovation policy has grown steadily since the turn of the new 
millennium, and more than 20 OECD countries have by now adopted R&D tax-incentives 
like SkatteFUNN. After a slump in the political attention in Norway, the commitment to 
innovation was reemphasised in the 2013 parliamentary election. However, there is an on-
going debate on how the government can best improve the level of innovation and economic 
growth. The newly elected government improved the conditions for the SkatteFUNN 
program, although the R&D target as a percentage of GDP has been criticised since it 
depends largely on the industry structure, and so it does not serve well as a specific policy 
objective and indicator for benchmarking exercises. The critique of the target is compacted 
by the fact that the majority of Norwegian industry is engaged in sectors that traditionally 
perform little formal R&D, while at the same time being innovative in a variety of different 
manners (Fagerberg et al., 2009; Wicken, 2009).  
 
Further, it has also been pointed out that Norwegian small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs), that benefit the most from the SkatteFUNN scheme, are above the OECD average in 
terms of R&D activity, whereas large Norwegian enterprises lag behind their counterparts in 
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OECD countries. So far, just over 10 000 different firms have received SkatteFUNN 
approval, but the distribution of these firms across size and sector is far from uniform, and 
many of the technological locomotives like Telenor and Statoil are actually not taking 
advantage of the scheme. 
 
Evolutionary growth theorising views firms as heterogeneous actors, and sees the variation 
this creates as fundamental for the further creation of novelty and innovations (Fagerberg et 
al., 2005). Although many academics argue that this assumption should be at the foundation 
of innovation policy design (Lundvall and Borras, 2005), this is certainly not the case when it 
comes to the formulation and design of R&D policy. In fact, R&D policy schemes are largely 
rooted in a mainstream understanding of innovation policy according to which intervention is 
supposed to correct failures and externalities in the knowledge market. The fact that R&D 
policy interventions may lead to substantially different effects for different firms and in 
different sectors is seldom taken into consideration. 
 
Previous evaluations of the SkatteFUNN scheme have found that the effect varies 
systematically between the firms (Cappelen et al., 2007), but they offer only limited 
discussion of why this variation occurs and what this consequently might entail for the total 
impact of the policy on the country’s economic performance and social welfare. In general, 
the typical mode of evaluating the effects of R&D tax-incentives has been quantitative, 
through micro-econometric studies investigating the degree to which the public policy 
support leads to increased private investment in R&D and generates more innovation. 
However, these econometric exercises focus on “average” results in a large sample of firms, 
and consequently have a limited ability to uncover heterogeneity of firms’ response and 
effects. 
 
Motivated by these questions, this thesis is devoted to the investigation of how and why 
firms´ response to SkatteFUNN tax-incentive varies, with the aim of contributing to our 
knowledge of R&D fiscal incentives, and in particular its effectiveness and appropriateness 
as a means to stimulate innovation and economic growth. Specifically, the thesis focuses on 
two dimensions that have received only limited attention in previous research in this field: the 
motivations that drive firms to apply to these R&D programmes; and the broader effects that 
these may have on firms’ strategies and capabilities, i.e. the so-called behavioural 
additionality. The work focuses on these two dimensions and investigates the extent to 
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which, and the possible reasons why, these factors differ between firms that already have 
R&D experience and capabilities vs. companies that do not have this prior experience and 
want to innovate for the first time. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter begins with an overview of the 
Norwegian context, which shapes both firms´ conditions and the design of policy, and a 
presentation of the SkatteFUNN programme and the main results from previous evaluations 
of the scheme. Chapter 3 presents the concepts and theories that have informed the design 
and evaluation of the policy, and also includes a general overview of the status of empirical 
evidence from tax-incentive policy evaluations. In the fourth chapter, I identify shortcomings 
of the extant evaluation literature, and present additional theories that illustrate these gaps 
and introduce propositions that could lead to a more realistic approach. At the end of the 
chapter I make my theoretical argument and formulate my two main hypotheses for the 
empirical analysis. Chapter 5 describes my research design and explain how I selected my 
cases and collected the data. I also discuss validity, reliability, and ethical considerations of 
my research. In the sixth chapter, I present my main findings and discuss how these relate to 
extant theory. The final chapter summarises the main conclusions of this research and 
discusses some potential implications of the findings. 
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2 Background 
 
The development of innovation policy in Norway has evolved alongside the advance of 
theories on innovation (Mytelka and Smith, 2002), new technological opportunities (OECD, 
1998; Fagerberg et al., 2009) and national and international economic conditions (Borrás and 
Lundvall, 1997; Spilling, 2010). Traditionally policies have centred on increasing research 
and development (R&D) activities, and have fallen under the remit of industrial policy. The 
systemic perspective, with its emphasis on processes of learning and the creation and transfer 
of knowledge, has broadened the policy focus to include the intricate relationships between 
the knowledge producing organisations and regulating institutions of the innovation system 
(Edquist, 2005, pp. 185; Spilling, 2010, pp. 12, 14).  
 
These factors have had a visible influence on the evolution of innovation policy in Norway 
and they continue to do so today. In the following I will take a brief look at the economic 
structural condition that has shaped Norwegian policy on innovation.  
 
 
2.1 Innovation patterns in Norway: historical background 
 
The Norwegian industry structure, or pattern of specialisation, has developed along three 
different paths. Firms across these paths differ significantly in their form of organisation, 
knowledgebase and the social groups they involve, constituting different innovation systems. 
The emergence and adaption of each path has presented different and sometime opposing 
firm needs, and over time a large and somewhat fragmented public support infrastructure 
developed. Distinctive components of the institutional set-up cater to the different paths` 
incentive structures for innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2009). 
 
The small-scale decentralised industrialisation path shaped the Norwegian economy during 
most of the 1800s. Born of the first Industrial Revolution, the agents of this development path 
were usually small-scale companies that relied on “traditional knowledge and forms of 
organisation” (Wicken, 2009b, pp. 34). Firm activity was usually characterised by strong 
localism, concerned with local supply and demand, governed by local rules and norms and 
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reliant on local knowledge. They typically invested little of their own revenue in innovative 
activities (Fagerberg et al., 2009; Wicken, 2009b). 
 
With the advent of new knowledge and technology in the late 1800s, early 1900s, 
opportunities presented itself for exploiting the rich natural resource endowments in Norway. 
Industrial application of chemical processes, electricity and the combustion engine, were 
among the novelties that enabled firms of the large-scale centralised industrialisation path to 
exploit economies of scale and scope (Fagerberg et al., 2009; Wicken, 2009b). These firms 
needed more formal organisational structures to manage their large-scale enterprises and 
relied on more science based and “codifiable” knowledge (Wicken, 2009b). Although these 
firms were innovative and employed highly educated labour, only a few firms developed in-
house R&D departments and most relied on foreign technology transfer and foreign capital 
(Fagerberg et al., 2009). As some firms closed in on the international knowledge frontier, 
investment in in-house R&D rose, but this is a relatively modern phenomenon, and 
throughout most of the 1900s the majority of innovation activity involved interaction with 
actors external to the firm. The important role these large-scale firms played in Norwegian 
economic development meant that a lot of the institutional set-up and public organisations 
were adapted to accommodate their needs (Fagerberg et al., 2009; Wicken, 2009b).  
 
The emergence of the third development path in the 1960s was again spurred on by new 
technology and application of knowledge (i.a. electronics, ICT and automation systems). 
Typical firms representing the knowledge-intensive network-based development path were 
smaller companies with a high R&D intensity, and it is often difficult to separate their R&D 
activity from production (Wicken, 2009b). The R&D intensive approach to innovation in 
these “new” industrial sectors involved highly formalised knowledge and basic research, and 
the firms had strong ties to public R&D institutions. Albeit policy attempts to foster the 
development of new industries in Norway this path never established a strong independent 
foothold and was instead absorbed into the older paths. The limited in-house capabilities, as 
well as favourable technology policy agreements, gave rise to a huge demand for R&D 
among the large-scale firms, especially from the petroleum sector. In effect, the growth in oil 
and gas related R&D displaced R&D efforts from other industries. The R&D intensive firms 
received a lot of political attention during the 1970s and -80s, but the wind turned during the 
1990s, as a more neutral policy was adopted. Today, these types of firms have an important 
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position in the Norwegian economy, but to a larger degree as technical enablers and problem-
solvers for the large-scale companies (Wicken, 2009a, 2009b).  
 
The evolution of Norway´s economic structure has had a strong impact on the development 
of the public support system, but at the same time that system has had an influence on the 
national constraints and opportunities of different sectors. Fagerberg et al. (2009, pp. 15-16) 
argues that these industrial systems coexist and that they all retain some influence on today’s 
national innovation system. 
 
2.2 Industry and innovation policy in Norway 
 
As illustrated by this brief historical overview, the national organisational and institutional 
set-up has developed over a long period of time, and innovation policy in Norway has far-
reaching roots in pre-war industry policy and post-war technology policy. 
 
Prior to the 1960s the main policy focus was to protect failing and stagnant sectors, and to 
support industries with competitive advantages.“[T]here was little interest in linking 
technological innovation with national industrial strategy” (Wicken, 2009a, pp. 89). Even 
though R&D had a low priority, the government worked to improve the productivity of the 
local industries, through various regulation and public institutions. Examples of this range 
from the creation of local savings banks and agencies that could provide business competence 
to small firms (Småindustrikontorer), to institutes for technology diffusion (Statens 
teknologiske institutt) and education (Wicken, 2009b, pp. 44-43).  
 
As with most of the other European countries at the time, Norwegian policy became more 
focused on R&D as a driver of economic growth, during the 1960s. Policy became more 
dedicated to develop new industries and new competitive advantages, instead of just 
sustaining old ones. Public funding for private R&D increased and it became a goal to 
harmonise public R&D with developments in industry. The 1980s saw a substantial influx of 
public R&D funding and between 1983-93 it increased by more than 80 per cent. By the end 
of the decade efforts were made to facilitate and promote development in specific 
technologies, where R&D activity was key. Through procurement and concession laws the 
government was already practicing sector specific protectionism, but the 1960s saw even 
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more focused intervention, as attention turned to building up, so called, “national 
champions”. This kind of targeted policy continued well into the 80s, albeit with changing 
technological emphasis. Even though this type of policy lost some of its traction as the 
concept of “innovation systems” permeated policy thinking in the early 1990s, it is still 
visible today (Wicken, 2009a; Clausen, 2009). 
 
In Norway, influence from OECD (1997, 2005) and the EU (European Commission, 1995) 
played a large part in defining innovation policy as an explicit policy field and in developing 
policies in suit with the new understanding (Spilling, 2010). Already during the 1990s 
“innovation” and “innovation systems” were discussed in parliamentary committees and 
white papers (St.meld. nr. 36 (1992-1993), 1993; NOU 1996: 23, 1996; St.meld. nr. 39 
(1998-1999), 1999), and several initiatives have heralded the growing importance of a 
broader innovation policy. In 1993, the State Industrial and Development Fund (SND) was 
created by merging four different funding institutions. The same year saw the integration of 
five autonomous research councils into one; the Norwegian Research Council (NFR) 
(Clausen, 2009). 
 
Even though a broader approach to innovation was introduced with the systemic perspective, 
stimulating R&D activity remained a central policy goal. New incentives for private sector 
R&D and commercialisation of research were proposed (NOU 2000: 7, 2000; NOU 2001: 11, 
2001; St.meld. nr. 20 (2004-2005), 2005) and new instruments for the facilitation and 
promotion of this were implemented (i.a., SkatteFUNN) (Spilling, 2010; Aanstad and 
Spilling, 2010). This was in line with international trends (Aanstad and Spilling, 2010), and 
in accordance with the Lisbon Agenda (European Commission, 2006) Norway was aiming at 
R&D expenditures at 3% of GDP – 1% public and 2% private. This goal contributed to 
strengthen policy efforts towards stimulating private R&D investment. 
 
Today almost half of the R&D is performed by the private sector, but it is still a far way to go 
to reach the target of 2/3. Solberg et al. (Solberg et al., 2014), from the Nordic Institute for 
Studies of Innovation, Research and Education (NIFU), find that approximately 25 per cent 
of public R&D funding goes to “business oriented” R&D-support. However, they emphasise 
that R&D funding for other activities and institutions, not defined as business oriented, also 
help private R&D efforts. There has been a growth in this type of funding, but much weaker 
than for other types over the past 10 years. Furthermore, even though the level of public 
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support for private R&D has increased the level of private R&D compared to GDP is the 
same as it was 25 years ago, and the reliance on resource based industry is just as strong 
(Solberg, 2014; Solberg et al., 2014). 
 
Following the government´s plan of exercising a more broad-based, or “holistic” innovation 
policy (NHD Plan, 2003), steps were made to further simplify and reorganise the various 
policy instruments available, gathering many of the smaller organisations and programs 
under the domain of “Innovation Norway” (formerly SND).  
 
The “holistic” plan that was introduced in 2003 was followed up in 2008 with a 
parliamentary white paper on innovation (St.meld. nr. 7 (2008-2009), 2008) that went further 
to incorporate the systemic approach and to expand the policy field. Even though this paper, 
and the consequent policy initiatives that were introduced, represented a considerable 
development for Norwegian innovation policy, it remains a quite unclear and low-prioritised 
policy area. As Aanstad and Spilling (2010) points out, the political emphasis on innovation 
seems to have declined throughout the decade and a lot of the plans have been characterised 
by rhetoric. This marginalisation does not seem to have been caused by opposing political 
approaches to innovation policy, but rather by deep-rooted conflict lines on research-, 
regional-, and economic policy (Aanstad and Spilling, 2010, pp. 33-34, 41, 43). 
 
Innovation policy received little attention in the parliamentary elections of 2005 and 2009 
(Aanstad and Spilling, 2010), but this changed in the 2013 election, where the conservative 
coalition government accentuated their commitment to facilitate private R&D and innovation 
in their coalition platform (Kallerud and Sarpebakken, 2013; Solberg-regjeringens politiske 
plattform, 2013). 
 
It is still unclear how we can design an effective holistic innovation policy, but in order to 
respond to specific Norwegian conditions, a first step for policy makers might be to acquire a 
better understanding of the innovation system as a whole. The lack of a broad review of how 
the current policy apparatus perform in relation to the national pattern of specialisation has 
been criticised, e.g. by illustrating the limitations of the 3% target (Aanstad and Spilling, 
2010, pp. 43-44).  
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Norway´s ranking on innovation scoreboards vary a lot between different scoreboards, but 
according to the German “Innovation indicator” Norway has moved from 14th to 7th place 
between 1995 and 2010 (Indikatorrapport, 2012, pp. 30). The economic development in 
Norway has relied substantially less on investment in R&D than other high-income 
economies in Europe, and a lot of the R&D performed has been publicly funded. R&D 
activity represent easily available data and is a popular measure for innovation, but R&D is 
merely one of several factors affecting innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2009). Furthermore, the 
propensity to do R&D and the relative value of R&D compared to other innovation activities 
varies across sectors (Castellacci, 2008; Malerba, 2005; Pavitt, 1984), and Norway has been 
dominated by sectors where R&D intensity traditionally have been low (DFØ, 2006). 
Fagerberg et al. (2009, pp. 10) show that even though the actual R&D investment levels are 
low Norwegian firm-level R&D investment match that of other high-income economies when 
adjusting for variance in national industry structures. Considering this, and the notion that 
innovation is more than the output of R&D investment, R&D as a share of GDP provides a 
weak platform for developing innovation policy (Aanstad and Spilling, 2010, pp. 44). 
 
In a review of the major R&D programs in Norway, Clausen (2009, pp. 364-66) found that 
subsidies emanating from the main Norwegian R&D programs were significantly more likely 
to end up in large firms with a proven R&D track record. It seems that the policy on fostering 
national champions still has a strong standing in Norwegian innovation policy, and it is 
pointed out that little is being done to help young and small firms confronted with financial 
market failure. However, the dataset used was based on 2001 figures and did not include data 
from the Norwegian tax-credit scheme, SkatteFUNN, that was designed to focus in particular 
on SMEs (Cappelen et al., 2010; NOU 2000: 7, 2000). 
 
2.3 The Norwegian tax-incentive program: SkatteFUNN 
 
2.3.1 History and description 
In order to reach the 3% R&D intensity goal, it was important to increase private R&D 
activity in Norway, and one of the instruments proposed in the “Hervik-committee” policy 
paper (NOU 2000: 7, 2000) was the establishment of a tax-credit scheme. This 
recommendation led to the creation of the SkatteFUNN-program, in 2001. However, in order 
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to be in compliance with EU/EEA1 regulations on state aid the program needed a few 
adjustments and became active first in 2002. The program is warranted by Norwegian tax law 
and regulations (Skatteloven, 1999 §§ 16-40 to 16-41; Cappelen et al., 2010; DFØ, 2006). 
 
SkatteFUNN is a tax-credit scheme that allows firms with approved R&D projects to deduct 
up to 20% of their R&D expenses directly from their payable taxes. The program can be 
described as a “catch all-instrument”, as it was designed to be project-, region- and industry 
neutral, as well as easy to administer and apply for (Cappelen et al., 2010). In their economic 
survey of Norway, OECD (2007) favours this neutral approach, contrasted to the “long 
[Norwegian] tradition of including regional, social and sectoral goals in industry policy” 
OECD (2007, pp. 112). 
 
SkatteFUNN can be seen as a continuation or expansion of the FUNN–program, which 
offered subsidies to buy external R&D services from universities and R&D institutes. 
SkatteFUNN still aims to facilitate cooperation between firms and R&D institutes by offering 
higher maximum deductions for these types of projects, but this type of cooperation is no 
longer a requirement for support (DFØ, 2006). 
 
Since expenses tied to income production already are deductible by Norwegian tax law 
(Skatteloven, 1999 § 6-1), some R&D-costs can be deducted (Skatteloven, 1999 § 6-25) 
regardless of the SkatteFUNN-scheme. The method of deduction varies from SkatteFUNN 
and must either be deducted from income (enhanced allowance), or as amortisation of assets. 
Deductions from income production cost and SkatteFUNN-projects rely on two independent 
sets of rules and the tax-credit offered by SkatteFUNN comes in addition to those warranted 
by § 6-1 in the tax law. With a corporate tax of 28%, the total deduction could in some cases 
cover almost 50% of R&D costs (DFØ, 2006, pp. 10, 82-83; Skattedirektoratet, 2014, pp. 
602-04; Ot.prp. nr. 1 (2001-2002), 2001, pp. 24, 36). 
 
2.3.2 Rules and function 
Since the program is “rights based” and operated through the tax system, there are no 
budgetary limitations forcing the SkatteFUNN-secretariat to “pick winners”. The firms 
themselves decide which R&D projects they want to apply for and as long as the projects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Norway is not part of the European Union (EU), but has agreed to harmonise laws and regulations in certain 
areas, through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement.	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meet certain criteria, and fall within the definitions of R&D used by the Norwegian Research 
Council (NFR), they are entitled to the deduction. This definition is established in the legal 
regulations of the program (FSFIN Forskrift til skatteloven, 1999 § 16-40-2), and the core 
requirements are as follows; the project descriptions must be focused and delimited from 
normal operations; they must seek to obtain new knowledge or skills, or recombine previous 
knowledge and / or skills; and the project must be valuable for the firm in developing new 
products, services or processes (DFØ, 2006). As pointed out by Cappelen et al. (2010, pp. 
98), the R&D definition at hand is not that different from the one used in the Frascati manual.  
 
Since 2003 both small and large enterprises have been eligible for the program, but the large 
firms can only deduct 18% of their expenses, while the small firms can deduct the full 20% 
(Skatteloven, 1999 § 16-40 paragraph 2; FSFIN Forskrift til skatteloven, 1999 § 16-40-5). 
 
Even though the projects may be as large as the firm likes, and span several years, there are a 
few caps in place that limit the number of years a project can receive support, as well as the 
maximum yearly deduction basis. Based on precedence projects can be approved for a five-
year timeframe, but it is possible to apply for an extension. Tax-credits, from internal R&D 
costs can be calculated from a maximum sum of NOK 8 million (approx. EUR 1 million), 
whereas tax-credits from R&D purchased from approved universities and R&D institutes can 
be calculated from up to NOK 22 million (approx. EUR 2,75 million). The upper limit, 
however, is NOK 22 million, so even if the project runs up external costs of NOK 22 million 
and internal costs of NOK 5 million, the deduction will be based on the NOK 22 million cap 
(Skatteloven, 1999 § 16-40 paragraph 2). R&D personnel usually represent the highest cost 
related to R&D projects, and so a maximum hourly wage is set to NOK 600 and a maximum 
number of hours per year is set to 1850, per person. Another cap is indirectly imposed by 
EU/EEA state aid regulations (EØS-loven, 1992 Art. 61 and 108; ESA Guidelines on State 
Aid, 1994) setting limitations to total public R&D support for small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and large enterprises (Cappelen et al., 2010; DFØ, 2006).  
 
These limitations make the program relatively more valuable for small firms that usually 
invest under the NOK 22 million cap anyway. The program regulations have gone through a 
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few alterations since 20022, especially in regards to the caps, but has at its core remained 
fairly stable. One argument for anchoring the scheme in the tax system was in fact to make it 
more resilient to shifting budget policies (Cappelen et al., 2010, pp. 97-98; DFØ, 2006, pp. 
81). 
 
The tax-credit is directly deducted from the payable taxes, but also firms that are not in a tax 
position are eligible for the program. In these cases the credit is paid out as a negative tax or a 
grant. Since the scheme works through the tax system the accrued costs must await approval 
and the credit is usually paid out the following year. However, the level of probable tax-
credits can be considered when calculating the advance tax, and firms can thus cash out some 
of the tax-credit the same year as the cost incurred (Cappelen et al., 2010, pp. 98; DFØ, 2006, 
pp. 89). 
 
The responsibility for the program is divided, but the SkatteFUNN-secretariat is situated in 
the Norwegian Research Council (NFR). Project approval is given by NFR, but is informed 
by initial recommendations from Innovasjon Norge (Innovation Norway). Although there 
exists a body of appeal, many of the rejected applications are instead resubmitted and 
approved, after the necessary clarifications and adjustments are made. Once the project is 
approved firms are responsible for delivering progress reports and separate project accounts 
for each year. The control and approval of the R&D costs, constituting the deduction basis, 
falls under the responsibility of the Norwegian Directorate of Taxes, who in turn relies 
extensively on auditors’ approval of project accounts (Cappelen et al., 2010; DFØ, 2006). 
 
Project approval is retroactive for incurred project costs from the same year. Permissible 
costs include personnel and indirect costs, R&D services purchased from approved institutes, 
project specific machinery and equipment and other operating expenses, all defined in the 
SkatteFUNN regulations (FSFIN Forskrift til skatteloven, 1999 § 16-40-6). It is, however, a 
requirement that these costs are deductible according to the tax law (Skatteloven, 1999 
chapter 6) on determination of general income (DFØ, 2006). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In 2003 the scheme was opened up for large enterprises. In 2007 a maximum hourly wage of 500 and the 
individual man hours pr. year limit was introduced. In 2009 the deduction cap for internal R&D was raised from 
4 to 5,5 million, and the cooperation cap was raised from 8 to 11 million. In 2011 the maximum wage was 
raised to NOK 530 and social cost calculation was reduced. In 2014 the maximum wage was increased to 600 
per hour and the maximum deductions raised to 8 and 22 million, respectively.  
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2.3.3 SkatteFUNN in numbers 
SkatteFUNN is the single largest R&D-support initiative in Norway, based on proceeds and 
number of firms supported (DFØ, 2006). According to calculations done at NIFU, 
SkatteFUNN tax-credits constitute 20 per cent of the public “business oriented” R&D-
support (Solberg, 2014; Solberg et al., 2014). 
 
The scheme has been active for over a decade and the number of applications has exceeded 
30 000. In their 10th annual report the SkatteFUNN-secretariat presented figures outlining 
some of the development of the scheme (NFR, 2012). Based on this, and numbers from their 
most recent reports (NFR, 2013; NFR, 2014), the tally shows that 24 619 individual projects 
were initiated by 10 343 individual firms, between 2002 and 2013. For the period of 2002 
and 2012, total tax deductions (paid out 2003-2013) amount to NOK 12 100 million (approx. 
EUR 1 512,5 million). 
 
The number of applications and approved projects has dropped a lot from its peak in 2003 
and has maintained a relatively stable level since 2007. Both the budgeted and the actual 
deductions followed this trend with a peak in 2004, declining until 2007, but have seen a 
strong growth since then. The raise of the maximum deduction cap in 2009 might explain 
some of this growth. 
 
As mentioned the program appears to be especially beneficial for small and inexperienced 
R&D performers. Between 2007 and 2013 roughly 80% of the active SkatteFUNN projects 
belonged to firms with less than fifty employees (NFR, 2014). Solberg et al. (2014, pp. 23) 
highlights the success of Norwegian R&D policy in fostering R&D activity in SMEs, but are 
critical to the apparent neglect of large firms. Today, Norwegian SMEs are highly ranked 
when it comes to R&D investments as a share of GDP, while the large enterprises score far 
below average.  
 
2.3.4 Evaluations 
There have been two large evaluations of the Norwegian tax-credit scheme. Commissioned 
by the NFR, at the behest of the Ministry of Finance, Statistics Norway (SSB) and 
subcontractor Norlandsforskning (Nordland Research Institute) undertook a large evaluation 
of SkatteFUNN between 2004 and 2008. The objective was to assess the schemes 
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performance in accordance with the intended effects; increasing private R&D investment; 
generating innovation; and stimulating knowledge based value creation in Norway. The 
effect of SkatteFUNN on the attainment of these goals was evaluated in several nuanced 
subprojects (Cappelen et al., 2008, 2010). 
 
At the end of 2005 the same ministry asked the Norwegian Directorate for Financial 
Management (DFØ)3 to conduct a separate evaluation of the financial management of 
SkatteFUNN. This was seen as a supplement to the SSB evaluation (DFØ, 2006). 
 
Through a difference-in-difference regression approach, Hægeland and Møen (2007) found 
that private investment in R&D was higher in firms that have been treated (i.e. received 
SkatteFUNN support). The positive effect on investment was found to be driven by small 
R&D performers from sectors that traditionally have a low R&D propensity (Cappelen et al., 
2010, pp. 101).  
 
While the SkatteFUNN program stimulates innovation in the form of new production 
processes, and to some degree new-to-the-firm products, Cappelen et al. (2007) found that 
the projects did not appear to contribute to increased patenting, or new-to-the-market 
products. The types of innovation the scheme contributes to are associated with a lower 
spillover potential, so the overall social return can be expected to be low. It was also pointed 
out that sectors with high R&D propensity experienced the strongest positive effect on their 
output (Cappelen et al., 2010, pp. 101-02). 
 
Alsos at al. (2007), from Norlandsforskning, argue that by affecting internal conditions in the 
firm, the SkatteFUNN scheme has a positive effect on R&D behaviour in firms with limited 
R&D experience (given that they had a good knowledge base, well developed dynamic 
capabilities and an entrepreneurial orientation). Experienced R&D performers, on the other 
hand, did not report similar changes (Cappelen et al., 2010, pp. 102). 
 
The scheme seems to have a limited positive effect on collaboration. Hægeland and Møens 
(2007) research show that few firms initiate collaboration with approved R&D institutes as a 
result of SkatteFUNN, and those with a history of collaboration do not increase this activity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  DFØ administers the state's economy regulations, and acts as an expert body. In 2011 they changed their name 
from Government Agency for Financial Management (SSØ).	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Findings by Cappelen et al. (2007) strengthen this notion with evidence of limited stimulation 
of inter firm collaboration (Cappelen et al., 2010, pp. 102). 
 
DFØ (2006) considered the administration of SkatteFUNN to be relatively efficient, but 
identified a few serious risks associated with the financial management of the program. 
Through interviews they encountered a “clear attitude to SkatteFUNN where «everyone 
knows» that it is easy to deduct too many work hours” (DFØ, 2006, pp. 10). Most of the risks 
were related to issues with inflation of the deduction basis, and challenges for assessing the 
actual costs. Some of these problems were tied to the inter-organisational set-up of the 
program and some were linked to the regulation. Among several recommendations DFØ 
proposed that the tax-credit scheme should be changed into a subsidy program, under the 
control of one single entity (DFØ, 2006, pp. 10-15). 
 
These risks open up for tax-motivated abuse of the scheme and some of the risks identified 
by DFØ (2006) were investigated by SSB. Fjærli (2007, pp. 23-24) reported that auditors 
found it difficult to control actual R&D expenses, and with some degree of certainty his 
analysis showed that when compared to the national R&D statistics, SkatteFUNN projects 
appear conspicuously more costly. This difference seemed to be more pronounced among the 
smallest firms, but based on the available data the same effect in larger firms could not be 
adequately tested. However, some “free rides” are to be expected with any kind of public 
subsidy scheme. When the cost of stronger control outweighs the benefits, a certain level of 
trust is necessary (DFØ, 2006, pp. 6-7). 
 
All in all, the SSB evaluation concludes that the scheme:  
“… mainly works as intended. The scheme is cost-effective and it is used by a large number of 
firms. It stimulates these firms to invest more in R&D, and in particular, the effect is positive 
for small firms with little R&D experience. The returns on the R&D investments supported by 
the scheme are positive and generally not different from the returns to other R&D 
investments” (Cappelen et al., 2010, pp. 107). 
 
Based on the market-oriented nature of the resulting innovations, they do however question 
what type of market failure is corrected through the scheme. The process- and new-to-the-
firm product innovation the scheme stimulates does not represent a lot of technological 
spillover potential. They further point out that the firms that responded to the scheme by 
increasing their own R&D investments could have done so either because they want to 
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capitalise on the price reduction on R&D, or that they with the help of the scheme can 
overcome some financial market failure. The latter is supported by the fact that the majority 
of the tax-credits are paid out as grants, indicating firms with liquidity constraints. However, 
since this pay-out first comes the year after the costs incurred, it could be argued that the 
correction of the failure is limited (Cappelen et al., 2010, pp. 106).  
 
Even though a positive change in firm behaviour often is used as a justification of the 
scheme, Alsos et al. (2007) does not develop the limited theoretical relationship between 
changes in firm behaviour and the market failure rationale. There is mention of system 
perspective rationales for public intervention, but their findings are not linked to any specific 
“system failures”. They do however point out a positive correlation between change in 
behaviour and positive changes in R&D input and output (Alsos et al., 2007, pp. 31, 106-
107). 
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3 Literature review 
 
The literature4 I review in the present chapter represents the academic basis used by policy 
makers and stakeholders to develop and evaluate innovation policy. I will begin by 
presenting the theoretical foundations for innovation policy and the rationale for public 
intervention. I will then continue with an outline of the various approaches and policy 
instruments, with specific attention to R&D tax incentives. I will finally conclude the chapter 
by presenting the typical evaluation exercise that is carried out in the current literature. 
 
3.1 Why do we need innovation policy? 
 
As more and more policy makers acknowledge that technological change is an important 
determinant for economic growth (Abramovitz, 1986) more and more governments have 
developed specific innovation policies set on stimulating future growth (OECD, 2010). 
 
It has been long assumed that some of the economic growth (all that could not be explained 
by factors in the models used) could be explained by technology. However, the share of its 
influence was significantly underestimated until the late 1950s (Verspagen, 2005). As a 
response to the inadequate exogenous growth models inspired by Solow (1956), two different 
approaches were taken to develop endogenous models that could better explain long-term 
growth. Both “neo-classical endogenous growth theorising” and “evolutionary growth 
theorising” acknowledge the importance of technological change for economic growth, as 
well as the important role played by public policy in this respect, but there are also some 
fundamental differences in the two approaches´ theoretical foundation. In a few words, one 
could say that the neo-classicalist trade a lot of realism for increased calculability, while the 
evolutionary approach has a trade-off in the opposite direction (Verspagen, 2005, pp. 492). 
 
3.1.1 Neo-classical endogenous growth theorising 
The neo-classical approach use representative agents in their models, making the growth 
process a whole lot more predictable. These homogeneous agents—assumed to be perfectly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  I identified the relevant literature by “snowballing” from the references used in text-books and “handbooks” 
on innovation. In order to make sure I presented the most relevant theories and empirical studies, I also used 
”Google Scholar” in combination with ”Thomson ISI web of science”, to confirm that I both included seminal 
work and more recent contributions.	  
	   18	  
rational—act under low uncertainty and exhibits maximising behaviour. This enables the 
neo-classical models to be built on micro foundations (Castellacci, 2007). Since perfect 
competition and symmetric information is assumed to result in a Pareto efficient equilibrium, 
working markets are expected to function optimally (Gök, 2010, pp. 86). Romer (1990) 
argued that technological change was one of the determinants for economic growth and that 
most of this change was attributed to individuals “acting on market incentives” (Backman et 
al., 2007, pp. 4-5). Furthermore, he treated knowledge as information (symmetrically 
allocated in a perfect market) and assumed that once these new technologies were created 
they could be readily available for all and could be reused at no further cost. This would 
mean that there is a spillover of knowledge and technology in the marketplace, and thus 
growth could be explained because the societal marginal benefit of a new technology would 
be larger than the private one (Backman et al., 2007, pp. 5; Gök, 2010, pp. 87). 
 
3.1.2 Evolutionary growth theorising 
In general, evolutionary growth theorising asserts that economic growth is a result of 
increased variety in the market, created as innovative ventures are explored (Castellacci, 
2007). Contrary to neo-classical thought, information is necessarily seen as asymmetric and a 
driver for variety creation. This variety undergoes a constant selection process where entities 
best adapted to the environment are rewarded, while the rest are weeded out. This selection 
process is usually taken care of by market forces (Verspagen, 2005).  
Because of the assumed uncertainty and information asymmetry firms are seen as 
heterogeneous, and possess different ability to create, absorb and exploit knowledge (Gök, 
2010, pp. 92). The actors are thus limited by bounded rationality, so the growth process is 
seen as unpredictable. Depending on how radical the innovation is in relation to the existing 
technological paradigms, the growth process can be characterised by either saltationist or 
gradualist evolution. This systemic approach takes on a non-reductionist position where the 
micro-and macro levels are interrelated and influence each other in a dynamic process. In 
addition, the evolutionary process of technological change is considered to be non-
deterministic and never ending as opposed to the new growth theory perspective where it is 
assumed that some degree of equilibrium eventually will be reached (Castellacci, 2007).  	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3.2 Rationale for public intervention 
 
“It could be argued that technology policy, like most other policies, could only be justified if 
it generates a net increase in social welfare” (Heijs, 2003, pp. 446). From the late 1800s 
there was increasing suspicion towards the idea that self-interest and social interest more or 
less harmonised under natural liberty (Medema, 2007). Today, two different approaches are 
being used to justify how intervention can increase social interest: market- and system 
failure. These are not mutually exclusive and both require attention from policy makers 
(OECD, 1998).  
 
3.2.1 Market failure 
The traditional rationale for governments to intervene in in markets has been tied to market 
failures. Efficiency of markets may be less than optimal in such cases where externalities (or 
spillover effects), information asymmetries, barriers to entry or indivisibilities are present.  
 
Under the neo-classical assumptions of perfect competition, Arrow (1962, pp. 619, 623) 
demonstrated how a market fails to provide socially optimal investment in knowledge 
creation, because of the limited appropriability, uncertainty and indivisible character of 
knowledge. However, this gap in public and social optimal investment in R&D can be 
mitigated by public intervention in some shape or form, that change the private marginal 
return of R&D investment (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999). Since the neo-classical models see 
input and output as identical, policies that either reduce cost or increase returns are equally 
applicable. However, the assumption that non-rivalrous knowledge has positive externalities 
dictates that policies should be general in order to reach the socially optimal level of R&D 
investment. The market failure rationale provides clear policy advice, but offers a limited 
understanding of knowledge and technology creation (OECD, 1998, pp. 45-48).  
 
In addition to this, Hall (2002, pp. 36, 38-39, 48) points out that investment in R&D is likely 
to suffer from financial market failure because of the uncertainty imbued in R&D. Moral 
hazard and asymmetric information can lead to very expensive external capital, especially for 
small and new firms.  
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3.2.2 System failure  
The evolutionary approach has led to a growing understanding of innovation as a systemic 
activity, where learning processes constitute a central element (Edquist, 2005). In their search 
for new opportunities firms rely on both internal and external sources of information. 
Successful innovation is thus affected, not only by the firms’ own performance (affected by 
market failure), but also by the quality of interaction with other actors (affected by system 
failure), i.e., if the interaction between knowledge producing actors is weak it could affect the 
pace of innovation (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999). 
 
Edquist (2005, pp. 187) identifies a provisional list of activities that influence the 
development, diffusion and use of innovation. Many of these activities take place through 
complex interrelations between the institutions and organisations in the system, and various 
conditions can constrain these types of activities. Some of the proposed systemic failures 
presented by Hauknes and Nordgren (1999, pp. 9-10), include learning failures, dynamic 
complementaries failures, appropriability traps, variety-selection trade-offs (Malerba, 1997), 
infrastructural provision and investment failures, transition failures, lock-in failures, 
institutional failures (Smith, 2000) and network failures (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). 
 
Policies originating in the system failure rationale focus on improving the institutional set-up 
of the system, in order to facilitate increased innovation opportunities for the firms. The 
systems approach opens up for new possibilities for stimulating innovation, but policy 
makers need to acquire intimate knowledge of their system´s peculiarities in order to make 
improvements (Hauknes and Nordgren, 1999). 
 
3.3 Policy instruments 
 
There are various definitions of “innovation policy” in play, but according to Spilling (2010, 
pp. 12) they are all concerned with how to facilitate and promote activities conductive to 
development, distribution and use of new knowledge and technology. It consists of a diverse 
mix of measures spread across a wide policy landscape (Berger et al., 2012, pp. 167), such as 
research-, technology-, regional- and educational policy” (Edquist, 2001). 
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Following a broad definition, there are three dimensions that should be considered when 
implementing an innovation policy. The first is the wider economic context including fiscal-, 
trade- and competition policy. The second dimension covers existing innovation policy like 
education and trade regulation. Finally, policies designed to handle the fallout of 
transformation (e.g. social-, labour- and regional policies), should be taken into account 
(Backman et al., 2007; Lundvall and Borrás, 1997) 
 
Lundvall and Borrás (2005, pp. 611-12) argue that innovation policy can be split into two 
different categories based on the aforementioned theoretical foundations. The neo-classical 
economics perspective emphasise policy affecting framework conditions for innovation, 
incentivising improved innovation effort at the firm level. In accordance with the assumption 
of perfect information and rational actors (in the absence of market failure), innovation 
possibility frontiers are considered set and improvement can only occur by increasing effort 
(Metcalfe, 1995).  
 
The other category, underpinned by evolutionary economics, takes on a more systemic 
perspective and sees innovation policy as a combination of a broad spectre of policy fields. 
Based on the assumptions that actors are not a homogeneous group, but make their choices 
based on imperfect information and bounded rationality, this approach considers the 
innovation potential frontier of firms to be dynamic (Metcalfe, 1995). In addition to market 
failures this perspective also considers systemic failures, i.e., shortcomings of the 
organisations and institutions that facilitate development, adoption and use of new knowledge 
(Metcalfe, 2005). Policies with this foundation aim at improving competence as well as 
incentivising effort (Lundvall and Borrás, 2005).  
 
Backman et al. (2007, pp. 3) divides innovation policies into general and specific 
instruments. Since some policies can have both specific and general characteristics, this is not 
necessarily an easy task. While general instruments provide the framework, specific ones 
provide a more targeted approach (e.g. support for specific industries or technologies).  
 
There are many ways to facilitate and promote public and private innovation. Some of the 
general policies suggested by Backman et al. (2007, pp. 10-21) are strengthening of IPRs, 
supporting intermediary institutions, improve and expand infrastructure, incentivise 
entrepreneurial behaviour, investment in higher education and basic research, secure 
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provision of venture capital and increase labour mobility. Some of the specific policies they 
mention are investment in regional innovation systems, support of cluster formation and 
development of knowledge centres, incentivising university spinoffs and promotion of 
public-private relationships (Backman et al., 2007, pp. 23-26). 
 
3.3.1 R&D tax-incentives 
Support for private R&D can take both a direct and indirect form. By choosing a direct 
approach governments can offer support to selected projects or industries via grants, loans, 
stipends, or via direct procurement of R&D. These methods aim at raising the private 
marginal rate of return, and place a large information requirement on the government agency 
that has to ensure effective use of the subsidy (Gulbrandsen, 2005). On the other hand, 
indirect instruments work by reducing the cost of R&D and are considered to represent a 
more neutral approach, as they usually are available for all firms in the economy (OECD, 
2010; David et al., 2000; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). 
 
The R&D tax-incentive approach has become widespread throughout the OECD. With more 
than 20 countries adopting such programs a growing share of innovation policy resources can 
be seen funnelled this way. It is also believed to be of the most efficient ways to remedy the 
private underinvestment in R&D (OECD, 2010).  
 
Tax incentives can be given as a direct deduction of the tax payable (tax credits), or as a 
deduction from the taxable income (enhanced allowances). What qualifies as an R&D project 
must be determined, and what types of expenditures that can be subsidised must be asserted. 
To provide maximum incentive for the companies a broad definition of R&D could be used, 
and all R&D related wages, expenditures, capital investments and acquisition of intangibles 
could be included. However, this approach may not lead to more innovation, than with a 
more restricted policy. Governments must choose if the incentive is to be equally available to 
all that meet the R&D project criterion, or whether some target groups, such as SMEs, should 
receive additional incentives. Finally the deductible amount can constitute all R&D 
expenditures (volume), or outlays over a certain amount (incremental) (OECD, 2010). 
 
However thoroughly the policy is designed, it does not necessarily mean that it will produce 
higher levels of innovation and lead to economic growth. One challenge is that R&D funding, 
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in general, have been known to drive up the wages of R&D workers in markets where access 
to high skilled R&D workers is limited (Cappelen et al., 2012, pp. 338; Grossmann and 
Steger, 2013, pp. 162). Another issue is that tax incentives might “crowd out” private 
investment instead of leading to additional innovation efforts (Clausen et al., 2008, pp. 2). 
Additionality can be defined as “the change in industry-financed R&D spending, or change 
in company behaviour or performance that would not have occurred without the public 
program or subsidy” (Clausen et al., 2008, pp. 2). Naturally, the increased popularity of 
innovation policies has brought with it an increase in innovation policy evaluation5. 
 
3.4 Evaluation of R&D policy 
 
In general, policy programs can be understood as “set[s] of technical activities managed to 
reach social objectives” (Arnold, 2004, pp. 4). The justification for innovation policy 
instruments rest on the failure of the system and of markets to provide socially desirable 
levels of innovation, assumed to increase economic growth. It then stands to reason that 
evaluation of a specific program should involve checking the “appropriateness of the means” 
in correcting the failure, as well as the impact or results (summative element) and 
effectiveness (formative element) of the implementation (Arnold, 2004). Evaluations are an 
important part of the policy cycle, and ideally the findings will feed back into the revision 
and adjustment of the policy (Howlett et al., 2009). 
 
3.4.1 Measurements 
Usually based on surveys, pre-existing data sets and interviews, evaluations of R&D tax 
incentives employ a range of analysis, from econometrics to counter-factual approaches – 
tools that are “considered appropriate to the very concepts of additionality” (Berger et al., 
2012, pp. 173). To get a better understanding of the interplay between public and private 
R&D, additionality is usually divided into different types (Clausen et al., 2008). 
 
If the policy effort is justified by the market failure rationale, a successful policy must 
increase the level of input- or output additionality to be successful. Input additionality relies 
on statistical comparison to estimate whether public funding leads to an increase in private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Arnold (2004, pp. 4) also point to the adoption of the “new public management” concept in policy 
administration as a cause for increased evaluation activity.	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R&D investment or displace private funds. In order to achieve an additionality effect, private 
investment in R&D must increase with more than it would without public intervention. This 
measurement is based on the assumptions that there is a positive relationship between input 
and output of innovation; there are constant and indivisible returns to scale; and that the 
source of investment does not affect output (OECD, 2006, pp. 12; Gök, 2010, pp. 89).  
 
However, input additionality is not sufficient for achieving the social objective of economic 
growth. For a policy to be successful the cost (including alternative cost) of funding R&D 
cannot be higher than the increase in social return. In order to ascertain this, there must be 
some measurement of the increase in outcome of R&D.  
 
Output additionality, is similarly based on statistical comparison, and is achieved if the level 
of innovation is higher with the support, than without. However, defining which indicators to 
measure in order to determine the effect of the output is not easy. For instance can a failed 
R&D effort still provide valuable knowledge for the actors involved, increasing the stock of 
“latent-innovation”. It is also difficult to measure the externalities of a new product, process 
or service, and even more so for less tangible outputs. By concentrating on the output within 
the boundaries of the firm evaluators have been able to operationalize the measurement, 
however, at the cost of accuracy Both input and output additionality are central 
measurements in most policy evaluations and rely on neo-classical assumptions (OECD, 
2006).  
 
A less developed, but increasingly popular concept, is the measurement of behavioural 
additionality. The concept was proposed to provide a more nuanced evaluation of public 
funding, i.a, open up the “black box” of input- and output additionality, and explain how 
public funding affects not just the project, but the entire organisation. Behavioural 
additionality seeks to explain changes in the knowledge base, strategies, routines or 
capabilities of a firm, and it can be defined as the persistent change in firm behaviour caused 
by the public funding (Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012; OECD, 2006; Gök, 2010). The effect 
can also be considered in firms that interact with the treated firm etc., but since the concept 
already is so broad, Antonioli and Marzucchi (2012) recommend that measurement should be 
delimited to the changes in the firm behaviour that is related to the policy goal. Most 
operationalisation of the concept focuses on a few variables and relies on comparative 
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statistics and the ceteris paribus assumption for estimating the level of change (Gök, 2010, 
pp. 97).  
 
To get the full picture the different additionality effects have to be considered together. 
Beyond the assumed relationship between input and output additionality, there has been 
hypothesised synergy effects between the three concepts (Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012), 
and Clausen et al. (2008) were able to show how these were interrelated, and also indicated 
possible directions of influence. First off, they split input additionality (IA) into direct and 
indirect IA. Without any direct IA, there can be no talk of additionality, as the effects would 
be achieved anyhow. Furthermore they point out that behavioural additionality is a 
prerequisite for indirect IA (e.g. in the form of R&D focus and R&D capability) and output 
additionality (e.g. as potential- and realised absorptive capacity). They suggest that “these 
relationships may vary depending on characteristics of the firm or their environment” 
(Clausen et al., 2008, pp. 20).  
 
3.4.2 Empirical evidence 
In an analysis of innovation policy evaluations Berger et al. (2012, pp. 177) combines 
purpose and timing, topics covered and related measure types, to create three classes of 
evaluation. According to these classifications, evaluations of R&D tax incentives usually are 
of the “holistic type”, which looks at both summative and formative aspects. The evaluation 
is usually planned in the design phase of the policy and look at both form-factors that can 
improve the programme, as well as goal attainment and impact assessments. Few evaluations, 
however, focus on the appropriateness of the policy instrument, beyond the program goals. 
 
Ascertaining whether R&D tax incentives do in fact lead to crowding-out or additionality is 
difficult, as the various studies have used different data sources, looked at different support 
programs, have been conducted in different countries and industries and applied different 
methods. However, the bulk of the existing research has been based on econometric 
approaches and most demonstrates a positive average effect on R&D activity (David et al., 
2000; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000; Cerulli and Poti, 2012). The majority of these studies have 
focused on the input- and output dimensions (Antonioli and Marzucchi, 2012). The statistical 
approach solves the problem with causal inference, but is thus unable to say much about the 
variation in firm response to a policy.  
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In a survey of the micro-economic literature, Castellacci and Lie (2014) investigate the 
effects of R&D tax-credits on firms´ innovation activities, across sectors. By comparing 
empirical results from high- and low-tech industries, they find that SMEs and firms in the 
service sector and low-tech industries on average obtain a stronger estimated effect of the 
tax-credits. Firms in high-tech industries experience a lower effect, especially in countries 
with an incremental tax-incentive model.  
 
Since the effect is strongest in industries that traditionally are less R&D-intensive, work with 
low-opportunity mature technologies and represent less spillover potential, the current 
programs could be considered inefficient if the goal is to reach an optimal level of 
innovation. In order to design programs better suited to further the national technological 
frontier, Castellacci and Lie (2014) proposes that policy makers should begin to consider 
sector specific conditions. 
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4 Literature gaps and hypotheses 
 
This chapter points out some important limitations and gaps in the literature reviewed in the 
previous chapter. I will present some theories, rooted in evolutionary and Schumpeterian 
economics, that provide some new insights as to how these gaps may be tackled in order to 
improve the framework for policy evaluation. At the end of the chapter, I will conclude by 
presenting the two main hypotheses of how and why responses to the Norwegian tax-credit 
scheme vary, and that will subsequently be analysed in the empirical part of the thesis. 
 
4.1 Gaps in extant literature 
 
The main issue I want to emphasise is the lack of attention to firm heterogeneity in R&D 
policy studies, which has limited the ability to evaluate the appropriateness of policy 
programs. Tax-incentive programs are usually designed to be broad, “catch-all instruments”, 
catering to firms from all sectors and often all types and sizes. It can, however, be questioned 
if this is appropriate, considering that most economies comprise a diverse group of firms that, 
based on distinctive conditions, have different needs and motivations, guiding their response. 
Elfring and De Man (1998, pp. 290) suggest that even though theories of the firm argue “firm 
heterogeneity”, policy makers seem to design innovation policy on the assumption of “firm 
homogeneity” (Clausen, 2013). 
 
As most of the studies of R&D policy have been quantitative and employed econometric 
methods, the main focus has been on the “average additionality effects”. The statistical 
solution solves the causal interference problem associated with counterfactual analysis, but 
takes a lot of nuance out of the results. By adding up the effects and considering the average 
additionality effects, an evaluation is unable to realistically consider the interplay between the 
effects, as they could be concentrated in different parts of the population. As a result there is 
little knowledge of how heterogeneity across firms and sectors affect the policy response of 
firms. 
 
The lack of attention to the heterogeneity of firms’ responses to R&D tax incentives is 
reflected in two further limitations of the extant literature. The first is that almost no attention 
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has been given the motivation of firms to apply for support, i.e., the reasons why a firm 
choses to apply to a tax deduction scheme, and what it wants to achieve with the support. 
While it is assumed that the firms that receive support suffer from some form of market 
failure, there is little or no research on whether this in fact is the case, and whether the 
associated constraints represent the underlying motivation a firm has for applying for the tax-
credits.  
 
Motivation can be understood as a construct of needs or desires, coupled with an expected 
reward, which in turn are conditioned by the internal and external influences a firm operates 
under. With this definition, “motivation to apply” could provide important insights as to why 
firms respond so differently to tax-incentives, but a more nuanced theoretical framework is 
necessary to understand how the different conditions vary, and to investigate how they 
influence firm behaviour.  
 
Relatedly, a second important limitation is that most studies in the literature have focused on 
input- and output additionality, since these effects are more readily measurable through 
quantitative and econometric analysis and are directly related to the neo-classical market 
failure rationale. Only a few have instead looked at the behavioural additionality effect a firm 
experience, and the ones that have are usually strictly delimited. By behavioural additionality 
I refer to the “persistent” change to a firm’s strategies and capabilities, which result from the 
new knowledge introduced as an effect of the public support. 
 
4.2 Knowledge and heterogeneity 
 
If innovation is to be understood as the creation, use and diffusion of knowledge, the ability 
of the firm to learn constitute a cornerstone of innovation. Teece (2000) highlights the 
distinction between information (“content”) and knowledge (“context”); “Knowledgeable 
people and organizations can frame problems and select, integrate and augment information 
to create understandings and answers” (Teece, 2000, pp. 40). Thus, acquiring information is 
not the same as acquiring knowledge. Sometimes knowledge needs to be bundled or 
embedded in products in order for firms to capitalise on it, but knowledge in the shape of 
competence and skills are just as valuable. Furthermore, knowledge can have different 
attributes, and often the transfer cost of knowledge can be high. As such, knowledge can be 
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considered a complex, but crucial economic asset. An asset that actually increases in value 
the more it is used, granted that the use does not place the same knowledge in the hands of 
competitors. The development of new knowledge can also make old knowledge obsolete, and 
with the increasing rate of technological change, firms are increasingly exposed to this type 
of “moral depreciation” of their intellectual capital (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Lundvall, 
2004; OECD, 2004). 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2.3, the emergence of knowledge intensive network-based firms was 
a response to the rapid development of information- and communication technology, but was 
also “pushed” by the low cost associated with flexible specialisation, as opposed to the more 
rigid organisation associated with economies of scale. A third phenomenon that conditioned 
this response was the increasing need for firms to continuously develop incremental 
innovations, in order to survive (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994). According to the OECD 
(2004) the firms involved directly with the production and sale of knowledge constitute one 
of the fastest growing sectors in the OECD countries. This, together with the broad increase 
in demand for skilled labour, has led this new economy to be dubbed the “knowledge 
economy” (OECD, 1996; OECD, 2004). 
 
For a long time there has been a bias towards treating knowledge as a scientific or technical 
outcome of a linear process that begins with formal R&D. This has led to a correspondingly 
biased attention from evaluators and policy makers, which have concentrated their energy on 
measuring and improving formal R&D. Several dimensions of knowledge have in this way 
been neglected (Jensen et al., 2007). 
 
Lundvall and Johnson (1994, pp. 27-28) distinguished between four different types of 
knowledge that all are combined in the process of innovation. Considering that the way to 
learn a specific type of knowledge varies across different mechanisms and channels, this 
categorisation provides a useful framework for understanding innovation. Know-what relates 
to what can typically be considered facts. Know-why concerns natural and social principles 
and “laws of motion”. Know-how refers to the skills needed to do something. Finally, know-
who pertains the social network and trust necessary to find out who knows what, and what to 
do (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Jensen et al., 2007). 
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The transfer of knowledge is important for innovation, and these four types of knowledge 
differ in terms of how tacit, or “sticky” they are. The concept of “tacit knowledge” was 
introduced by Polanyi (1966) and refers to the fact that not all knowledge can be articulated 
or be satisfactory described and can only be captured fully through repeated practice in the 
appropriate context. Very little knowledge is completely public or completely private, as 
even explicitly codified knowledge have to be identified through search, and often cannot be 
fully understood out of context. Know-what and know-why can potentially have a very 
transferable character, as know-what can be stored and accessed in various databases, and a 
lot of know-why can be made publicly available in the form of theorems. Know-how and 
know-who, on the other hand, can only be documented to a certain degree, as it is difficult to 
separate the necessary set of skills and competence from a person that performs the specific 
function (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Lundvall, 2004).  
 
Lundvall (2004) mentions that it can be useful to distinguish between “tacit” for the lack of 
incentives to codify, and “tacit” by nature. From a social perspective codification is desirable, 
as it enhance the degree to which knowledge can be disseminated. However, even though a 
piece of knowledge can be codified does not imply that the firm will want to make it explicit. 
Besides making the knowledge more manageable within the firm, the process also opens up 
for the possibility that competitors get access to the knowledge. 
 
These different types of knowledge have to be learned in different ways, and Jensen et al. 
(Jensen et al., 2007, pp. 680) proposed two different modes of learning that correspond with 
the types of knowledge. The “science, technology & innovation” (STI) mode produce highly 
codified know-what and know-why, while the doing, using & interacting (DUI) mode is 
focused on the experience-based creation of know-how and know-who. The STI approach 
usually involves formal processes of R&D, either at the basic or applied level. The DUI mode 
focus more on the learning outcomes that can be attained from informal interaction, either 
with other knowledgeable people, or with knowledge embodied in products, like machinery 
and equipment. There is a long tradition for considering innovation purely as a result of STI 
learning processes, but more recent conceptions peg innovation as a more interactive process 
involving both internal and external sources of knowledge, placing emphasis on both STI and 
DUI modes (Lundvall, 2004; Jensen et al., 2007).  
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Learning can be both intentional as a result of costly and targeted search and it can be a by-
product of regular operations, but various types of learning are usually interrelated. These 
capabilities will gradually develop with experience. Furthermore, the cumulative traits of 
knowledge and learning, can lead to path-dependency, in which knowledge production follow 
certain trajectories (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Lundvall, 2004; Malerba, 1992). 
 
The differences between the four types of knowledge have to some researchers suggested that 
there may be significant variation between different sectors´ knowledge base. Certain 
opportunities and constraints associated with the technologies a firm is working with, and 
both the learning mode and outcome of innovation can be expected to follow particular 
technological trajectories. These differences are mirrored in the various innovation modes 
and outcomes, and several contributions have been made to explain these sectoral patterns 
systematically. A seminal contribution in this respect is Pavitt´s (1984) taxonomy, where he 
by comparing the sources of knowledge with the nature of the technology produced, 
identifies four specific groups of firms and sectors. Castellacci (2008) further developed this 
taxonomy, and found that particular innovation modes were concentrated in specific sectoral 
groups. Jensen et al. (2007) also found that typical low-tech firms and firms in the service 
industries were less involved with STI-modes of learning (Dosi, 1988; Lundvall and Johnson, 
1994; Lundvall, 2004; Malerba, 1992). 
 
Jensen et al. (2007, pp. 690) indicated that firms that focused exclusively on formal STI 
mode learning would miss out on valuable gains from the DUI focused learning, and that 
strategic measures can be taken to facilitate DUI learning by adapting appropriate routines 
and the organisational structures. With the rapid development of technologies and increased 
access to knowledge, it is exceedingly important for firms to be able to navigate through the 
plethora of available knowledge. Firms have always managed knowledge, though perhaps 
without defining it as such, but today the need for a clear and strategic management to meet 
the challenges of the knowledge-economy is paramount (OECD, 2004).  
 
According to the OECD (2004) knowledge management not only has a positive effect on 
innovation, but also on other activities in the firm, such as labour productivity. The 
widespread adoption of knowledge management practices have been strongest in high- and 
medium-high tech industries and is also more pronounced in large firms. With the positive 
effects, and this skewed uptake in mind, they argue that some of the variation between OECD 
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country performance and productivity might be explained by a “knowledge management 
gap”. 
 
4.2.1 Dynamic capabilities and corporate learning 
In order to stay ahead in the new knowledge economy Teece (2000) argues that firms must 
strengthen their processes for accumulating, shielding, transferring and integrating 
knowledge, and in order to efficiently manage knowledge a firm needs certain dynamic 
capabilities in place. 
 
The concept of dynamic capabilities was developed by Teece et al. (1994, 1997) with the 
goal of better explaining how competitive advantage is attained and maintained. There are 
several different conceptualisations and interpretations of dynamic capabilities (Stefano et al., 
2010), but it is part of the strategic management literature, and with its focus on the effective 
exploitation of firm resources it is considered a contribution to the resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm. 
 
The RBV sees firms as heterogeneous bundles of resources (tangible or intangible inputs to 
production) and has focused on the competitive advantages that can be obtained by 
effectively exploiting these firm-specific resources, i.e., by aligning complementary activity 
systems with firm-specific resources (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). However, Teece and 
Pisano (1994, pp. 538) argue that effective exploitation of resources, by itself, does not lead 
to competitive advantages, and the “dynamic capabilities” view contribute to the resource-
based perspective on accumulation of resources, by adding the dimension of “timely and 
appropriate response to the changing environment”. 
 
The concept is concerned with strategic management response to shifts in the environment 
the firm is situated in. Teece and Pisano (1994) suggest that the firm’s current practice, or 
routines (processes), its innate resource endowment (position) and the strategic alternatives 
available (paths) define this strategic dimension. The capabilities of the firm constitute its 
processes and position, and by “appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring 
internal and external organisational skills, resources, and functional components toward 
changing environments” (Teece and Pisano, 1994, pp. 541) firms can develop and maintain 
competitive advantages. It is, however, only by affecting operational capabilities (e.g. 
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workflow automation or supply chain management) that the dynamic capabilities can 
contribute to the output of the firm (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
 
In order to create and maintain an advantage over competitors firms endeavour to sense and 
act upon opportunities, and develop appropriate capabilities faster than their rivals. The 
dynamic capabilities should be constructed from “difficult-to-replicate non-tradable assets” in 
order to defend the edge it represents (Fosfuri and Tribó, 2008; Teece, 2000). Knowledge 
assets are crucial towards this end, and according to Sauuila and Ukko (2014) dynamic 
capabilities mainly consist of such intangibles. 
 
The environment the firm is situated in affects the potential strategic paths a firm can take, 
and their relative attractiveness. Among these factors, Teece (2000, 2007) calls attention to 
the strength of the appropriability regime, the phase of industrial and technological 
development, the degree of regulation, and the firm´s relative position to competitors 
regarding complementary assets. These factors affect the potential premium associated with 
knowledge management and dynamic capabilities.  
 
Since capabilities cannot be bought in the marketplace, they have to be built, or learned, 
inside the firm (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Since many of the organisational routines are based 
on tacit knowledge, Nelson and Winter (1982) understood that experience-based learning 
accounted for many of the changes in organisational routines. Since tacit knowledge and 
capabilities are “stored” in routines, we can consider routines a main unit of analysis for 
change in firm behaviour. The different experiences with new knowledge introduced through 
the policy intervention, and the varying ability to learn from these, will be highly 
heterogeneous. Antonioli and Marzucchi (2012, pp. 132) refer to a few empirical studies 
where differing patterns of behavioural additionality have been identified across different 
sectors, innovation categories, and firm sizes. This implies that much of the strategy and 
capability diversity stem from path-dependency, and reflect unique circumstances that have 
led the different firms towards certain routines. 
 
Determined by its processes and position, the development and evolution of dynamic 
capabilities can thus to a large degree be said to depend on a firms cumulative experience and 
learning processes, both targeted and arbitrary (Fosfuri and Tribó, 2008). Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000, pp. 1114-1115) point out that codifying the experiences of both failures and 
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successes improves the adoption of that knowledge into more regular practice, or routines. 
They also argue that the pacing of the experience has an impact on the ability to learn from 
them. 
 
It is necessary to consider the dimension of time in order to say anything about how 
competitive advantages are obtained. As pointed out by Zahra and George (2002), “when” a 
firm develops a capability will affect whether it will contribute towards a competitive 
advantage. They point out that as industries or technologies mature dominant designs often 
appear. Nelson (1991) refers to this as extinguishing of strategic diversity. In order to gain 
comparative advantage from a capability it must thus be deployed well in advance of its 
competitors, and the position must be defended. 
 
A capability will usually go through many transformations before it actually may provide any 
advantage. Helfat and Peteraf (2003) introduced the concept of capability lifecycles in an 
attempt to characterise the evolution of a capability. They suggest that after the initial 
founding, development and maturity stages, capabilities can branch into retirement, 
retrenchment, renewal, recombination, replication, redeployment, or a combination of these. 
Branching is initiated either to seize opportunities for growth or change, or in response to 
threats that could render the capability obsolete. The opportunities or threats can come from 
inside or outside the firm, and must be strong enough to induce an alteration of the current 
trajectory (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
 
Branzei and Vertinsky (2006) use this concept of capability lifecycles together with Zahra 
and Georges (2002) concept of pay-off schedules to develop a typology of capabilities, to 
assist strategic management. They believe that by making strategic learning efforts in the 
direction of capabilities that present immediate pay-offs, inexperienced and resource 
constrained firms can quickly improve their situation.   
 
When it comes to innovation centric capabilities most of the existing studies have only 
focused on one or two aspects. Through a literary review, survey and accompanying factor 
analysis Sauuila and Ukko (2014) identify seven aspects of “innovation capability” that firms 
should be attentive to. They discovered that a participatory leadership-culture was especially 
conductive to innovation. In addition they recognise ideation and organising structures, work 
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climate and well-being, know-how development, regeneration, external knowledge, and 
individual activity, as important focus areas. 
 
4.3 Inter-sectoral heterogeneity  
 
When it comes to analysing the effects of R&D policy on firms’ innovation, a first relevant 
dimension to investigate is the existence and extent of differences across sectors. Both 
theoretical contributions and empirical studies support the idea that different industries have 
very different ways of innovating, and that this is related to differences in knowledge base, 
which actors are involved and the relationship between them, and the relevant institutions 
that affect innovation (Castellacci, 2008). Furthermore, the maturity of an industry will affect 
the competitive environment, e.g. through new-firm formation and the degree of a dominant 
design. Together, these influences constitute particular conditions that are associated with 
different incentive structures for engaging in R&D.  
 
The premise of heterogeneity in evolutionary theory can explain much of the different 
innovation patterns between sectors. Knowledge production and learning processes are 
essential in explaining change, and heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality will have 
different ways of utilising different knowledge bases, and for different reasons. Under 
uncertain conditions and in a dynamic environment these different characteristics will work 
to maintain these heterogeneities, and contribute to the creation of variety (Malerba, 2005). 
 
Sectors vary in several respects: industries do for instance rely on different knowledge bases 
with differing characteristics. The knowledge underlying the technology of one sector may 
for instance be more or less tacit, specific or complimentary, than the knowledge associated 
with another technology. Technological opportunity available under a given technological 
paradigm is another related element that varies. The higher the opportunity for innovation is, 
the higher the incentive to invest in R&D. Another factor is the appropriability conditions 
available to an industry. Here, firms in sectors with high appropriability conditions should be 
disposed towards investing in innovation. If the knowledge has cumulative properties, 
companies that have previously invested in innovation are expected to gain relatively more 
from additional investment than newly innovating companies (Malerba, 2005). 
 
	   36	  
Another dimension is the industry’s position in the vertical production chain; whether the 
sector is a supplier or producer of knowledge and technology, in the economy as a whole. 
Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy took account of this by looking at a sectors source of innovation, 
and its appropriating mechanisms. He identified four types of sectoral patterns: Supplier-
dominated, scale-intensive sectors, specialised suppliers, and science-based sectors. The 
earlier in the production chain a new knowledge or technology is introduced, the larger the 
spillover effect becomes. This will in turn increase the social value as the knowledge is 
reused to produce new knowledge. 
 
Castellacci (2008) builds on the above-mentioned traits and concepts, when he introduces a 
taxonomy that includes both manufacturing and service industries. By using the two concepts 
of “dominant regime and trajectory”, and function in the vertical production chain as either 
provider or recipient of knowledge, he divides industries into four sectoral groups: (i) 
Advanced knowledge providers, (ii) mass production goods, (iii) supporting infrastructural 
services, and (iv) personal goods and services.  
 
(i) The group of “advanced knowledge providers” (AKP) includes specialised suppliers 
within manufacturing, and providers of solutions and knowledge in services. Most often built 
up of SMEs, this group is highly capable of creating complex knowledge and represent the 
supporting knowledge base of the entire economy. The knowledge they produce is often 
developed in close cooperation with their users and customers. 
 
(ii) Industries that are scale-intensive and / or science based are labelled “mass-production 
goods” (MPG). This group of industries usually have a large degree of in-house R&D, and 
usually consists of large companies. These sectors are still quite early in the value chain and 
embed knowledge in intermediate goods. In a sense they act as carriers of the technological 
paradigm. 
 
(iii) So-called ”supporting infrastructural services” (SIS) have a more limited ability to do 
in-house R&D, and attain a good portion of their new knowledge through acquisition of 
machinery and equipment. The group is made up of large firms that provide physical and 
distributive infrastructural services, as well as network infrastructure services. These services 
produced in these sectors are important for the diffusion of knowledge in the economy. 
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(iv) The last group of industries, “producers of personal goods and services” (PGS), mainly 
consist of SMEs that deliver consumer ready goods and services. The companies in these 
sectors are at the end of the knowledge production value chain, and usually rely on 
technology developed elsewhere. Traditionally there is very little internal R&D activity in 
this group (Castellacci, 2008; Castellacci, 2010).  
 
As some sectors can be seen as presenting more opportunities, less complexity and associated 
risk, better appropriability conditions, and higher cumulativeness, it seems clear that certain 
sectors benefit more from their R&D efforts than others, in terms of returns on investment 
relative to value added. This is in line with the patterns that emerge from the aforementioned 
taxonomies, which show that it is much more likely to find firms engaged with R&D in AKP 
and MPG sectors, than in the SIS and PGS groups. Sectors in the “physical infrastructure” leg 
of SIS, and in the PGS group may be highly innovative, but traditionally they rely on other 
modes of innovation than formal R&D.  
 
4.4 Intra-sectoral heterogeneity  
 
Although firm-level heterogeneity is an important aspect underpinning the variety-selection 
process, the “sectoral innovation system” and “technological regime” literature has to a large 
degree portrayed firm behaviour as industry-specific (Drejer and Leiponen, 2007). 
 
There are at least three different perspectives on innovation that can be used to emphasise the 
importance of firm-level heterogeneity, and which may have relevance to investigate firms’ 
heterogenous response to R&D policy schemes. The bounded rationality of firms, postulated 
in evolutionary economic theory, imposes restrictions on firms´ search for threats and 
opportunities, and their perception of potential value. The resulting “localised” search could 
possibly explain the different strategies observed. The dynamic capabilities perspective 
explains differences among firms as a deliberate attempt to achieve competitive advantage, 
and these capabilities are also expected to vary based on innate differences in knowledge and 
experience (Drejer and Leiponen, 2007). 
 
In their study, Drejer and Leiponen (2007) do not deny that external factors, such as 
technological and commercial opportunities and constraints, can have an effect, but they 
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stress that industries are far from homogeneous when it comes to the innovation mode of 
firms. They find that multiple modes of innovation can be identified within most industries, 
and only a minority of the industries observed displayed a dominant regime. This intra-
sectoral heterogeneity was consistent across high- and low-tech, and manufacturing- and 
service sectors. They conclude that, in terms on innovation behaviour, firms within the same 
industry cannot be treated as a homogeneous group, and suggest that “firms´ strategic 
differentiation or local search activities overcome pressures in the technological environment 
towards homogeneous behaviour” (Drejer and Leiponen, 2007, pp. 1221). 
 
By excluding local search in “rugged landscapes” as a likely cause, they suggest that the 
observed firm-level variation is a result of deliberate strategic differentiation and their initial 
resource and capability endowment. Wrapping up their concluding remarks they also point 
out that the description of innovation behavioural patterns offered by Pavitt’s taxonomy 
seems to describe firm-level differences, instead of industry-level regimes. 
 
Similar findings have been made by Peneder (2010) and Clausen (2013), but they look at 
slightly different aspects, and they find that both firm-level and industry-level factors 
contribute to heterogeneity. By focusing on the firm-level distribution of different innovation 
modes within industries, instead of looking at average behaviour at the industry-level, 
Peneder (2010) found the firms in the same industry constitute a huge variety of innovation 
types, but he was at the same time able to identify systematic differences between distinct 
technological regimes. He argues that heterogeneity in innovation behaviour is produced by 
both firm- and industry-level factors. These factors are interrelated, and contingent on the 
firms´ ability to match the competitive environment imposed by the technological, social and 
economic influences with appropriate strategy and structure (Peneder, 2010). 
 
In his recent work, Clausen (2013) looked at the extent to which approaches to, and outcome 
of, innovation differed between firms in the same industry. His findings suggest that when it 
comes to firms´ perception of their opportunities and constraints, and their search for these, 
“technological regimes” have a limited influence. However, he did find that technology does 
impose boundaries on what a firm actually can create – In his own words: 
 
“… ‘technological regimes’ (Malerba and Orsenigo 1996; Breschi, Malerba, and Orsenigo 
2000), ‘sectoral patterns of technical change’ (Pavitt 1984) and ‘sectoral innovation systems’ 
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(Malerba 2005) have an influence on the organisational capacity to innovate, especially 
when it comes to product innovation” (Clausen, 2013, pp. 536). 
 
These results have implications for the theoretical development, as “technological regime” 
and “resource-based” theorising appears to complement each other, as well as for policy 
design, where the assumption that industries consist of homogeneous actors should be 
questioned. 
 
4.5 Hypotheses 
 
The theories presented in this chapter underline the need for a more nuanced approach to 
R&D policy evaluation that acknowledges that the characteristics of different types of 
knowledge and learning lead to heterogeneous firm behaviour. In order to explain why 
Norwegian firms respond so differently to the SkatteFUNN scheme, this thesis focuses on 
two relevant aspects: the first is how and why firms` motivation for applying to the R&D tax 
incentives scheme varies among sectors, as well as among firms; the second is the extent to 
which firms that benefit from tax incentives schemes such as the SkatteFUNN experience 
markedly different behavioural additionality effects. 
 
First, in order to explain how the motivation varies, it is necessary to identify a variable that 
may function as a good proxy for the concept of heterogeneity. The latter is in fact a broad 
and encompassing concept, as noted in the previous sections, and it is then important to point 
out the specific aspect of heterogeneity that this thesis will focus on (while disregarding other 
potentially important aspects). To gauge the appropriateness of a R&D policy it seems 
reasonable to distinguish the companies that apply to the SkatteFUNN program on the basis 
of their previous experience with R&D, namely to distinguish between R&D-experienced 
firms (i.e. companies that have already carried out R&D projects in the past at the moment of 
applying for SkatteFUNN support), and non-R&D-experienced firms (i.e. new innovators 
that apply for the first time to the scheme). In other words, we can use the level of experience 
with R&D as a proxy to take into account the different capabilities and knowledge resources 
that distinguishes established and persistent innovators from new and less experienced 
innovators. Based on the literature summarised in the previous sections, it is likely that firms 
with no prior R&D experience have yet to develop formal R&D capabilities, or are likely to 
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be subject to financial constraints and lack funding to invest in R&D. Furthermore, it is 
reasonable to expect that non-R&D experienced firms will be overrepresented in industries 
that mainly are recipients of advanced knowledge (e.g. personal goods and service providers), 
and that their innovation efforts, if any, have been based on the DUI mode of learning rather 
than formal R&D investments. 
 
By focusing on this dimension as a sort of main explanatory factor, we can point out two 
general hypotheses, one referring to firms’ motivation to apply to tax deduction schemes, and 
the other on the behavioural additionality effects that different companies will experience.  
 
The first hypothesis intends to test how R&D experience affects the motivation to apply for 
SkatteFUNN tax-credits, i.e., how this motivation differs between established innovators and 
new R&D performers: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
 
R&D experienced firms, which have already developed formal R&D capabilities in 
the past, are more likely to apply to SkatteFUNN in order to reduce the costs of their 
R&D projects or to expand their scale.  
 
Non-R&D experienced firms, on the other hand, are more likely to apply for 
SkatteFUNN in order to secure the necessary funds they need to cover sunk costs and 
start investing in R&D. 
 
The second hypothesis shifts the focus on behavioural additionality, and it has thus a more 
dynamic character than the first hypothesis. As defined above, by behavioural additionality I 
refer to the persistent changes in a given firm’s technological and managerial capabilities 
brought by the participation in a R&D support programme.  The increased capability that a 
company develops thanks to the R&D support will, among other things, also affect and shape 
its motivation to apply to other R&D programmes in the future, since it is reasonable to 
expect that a new innovator, after having carried out R&D for the first time and made the 
necessary investments in R&D facilities, will become more interested and prone to continue 
to invest in R&D in the future and hence participate again in R&D incentive programmes, 
such as SkatteFUNN.  
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Comparing again the group of established innovators with previous R&D experience and the 
group of new innovators without prior R&D experience, it is not easy to formulate an ex-ante 
hypothesis on whether the behavioural additionality effects will be stronger for the first or for 
the latter group. On the one hand, R&D experienced firms can draw upon their stock of 
existing knowledge and capabilities and build upon their previous experience, resources and 
results – so we may expect them to experience learning by doing and cumulativeness effects 
over time. On the other hand, however, non-experienced firms might also be expected to 
experience the strongest behavioural additionality effects, since they start from a lower 
capability level, and therefore have more to learn and a larger catch-up potential and scope 
for imitation. Hence, instead of formulating one single proposition, I think it is more 
appropriate to point out two opposing propositions that should be verified and investigated on 
the basis of the empirical evidence in the specific Norwegian context: 
 
Hypothesis 2a:  
R&D experienced firms will experience stronger behavioural additionality effects, as 
the public support will build upon their previous knowledge, capabilities and 
resources. 
 
Hypothesis 2b:  
Non-R&D experienced firms will experience stronger behavioural additionality 
effects, since they have more potential to learn and bigger scope to catch-up. 
 
As described in the next chapter, the thesis will investigate the relevance of these two 
hypotheses by making use of qualitative methods of research and carrying out a large number 
of in-depth face-to-face interviews with Norwegian companies that have carried out 
SkatteFUNN-funded R&D projects during the last few years. 
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5 Data and methodology 
 
In this chapter, I will explain some of the choices I have made regarding data and 
methodology, and I will clarify how I selected, collected and analysed the data. This is done 
with the intention of assessing the validity of the research, and by providing the reader with 
transparency to strengthen the reliability of my findings. I will begin this chapter by 
discussing the qualitative case study approach and the appropriateness of this methodology. 
Then I will move on to the selection of my samples and presentation of the cases. The data 
collection section describes the methods and processes of gathering data. Towards the end of 
the chapter, I will present the process of analysis, before I discuss validity-, reliability- and 
ethical issues in the final section. 
 
5.1 Case study framework 
 
The nature of my research question guided my choice of method and since I sought to 
understand “how” and “why” the firms respond differently, I decided a comparative case 
study would be well suited for my needs. By structuring my research around the study of a 
few cases I was able to do an in-depth examination of the phenomenon in question (variation 
in firms` responses to SkatteFUNN) and how various contextual influences might explain the 
observed variance. By comparing cases I aimed at identifying patterns of differences and 
similarities, and to ascribe some of these to specific contextual influence (Baxter, 2010; 
Ragin and Amoroso, 2011; Yin, 2009). To the best of my knowledge there exists very little 
qualitative research on policy evaluation, thus this thesis represents an important novelty, by 
contributing with deep data analysis. 
 
Within a case study framework it is possible to apply several methods at once, both 
qualitative and quantitative, and although I have used a survey to complement my interview 
data, my primary data is based on qualitative approaches (Punch, 2005). Thagaard (2009, pp. 
17-18) points out that qualitative methods are more apt for deep and context aware research 
of social phenomena, and in order to obtain detailed insight into the respondents’ thoughts 
and experience with SkatteFUNN, I chose to conduct interviews with representatives from 
each firm. Even though the focus of the interviews was chosen through a thorough and 
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critical review of relevant theory and empirical data, the flexible attributes of this method 
allowed for an exploratory element. Initial findings revealed new topics and dimensions that 
called for a closer examination, and I chose to follow this up with a more structured and 
restrictive survey. 
 
The natural progression of the thesis might indicate a linear research design, but the process 
has been dynamic and evolved over several cycles, as new theory and data has been 
introduced. Nonetheless, it has been important for me to work with a model for the research 
in order to stay rational and critical in my pursuit of answering the research question.  
 
Based on the relevant theories and empirical evidence I developed my research question with 
the intention of contributing to our understanding of tax-credits as a policy instrument. The 
focus of the research question and the deductive nature of my thesis made a comparative case 
study a well-suited approach.  
 
5.2 Sources of data 
 
5.2.1 Selection of cases 
I considered all firms that had concluded SkatteFUNN projects within the last 5 years as 
relevant for the study. In my attempt to say something about the variation in firms’ response 
to the tax-credit, I made a purposive quota sampling of my cases (Punch, 2005; Thagaard, 
2009) through a two-step process.  
 
First, I generated a random sample of 150 firms from the total population of firms with 
approved SkatteFUNN projects. The data on the total population of SkatteFUNN projects 
was kindly provided by the Norwegian Research Council. Table 1 and figure 1 show the 
population of new projects approved between 2011 and 2013, for all manufacturing and 
service sectors. The sectoral groups adopted here are the same pointed out in the previous 
chapter in relation to Castellacci’s (2008) taxonomy (see section 4.3 in the previous chapter). 
A description of the correspondence between NACE sectors and the sectoral groups of this 
taxonomy is available in Appendix C.  
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Table 1. Sectoral group distribution of new SkatteFUNN projects, 2011-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average sectoral group distribution of new SkatteFUNN projects, 2011-2013 
 
 
 
 
The second step of the data collection process was to select a random sample of firms from 
this population according to three selection criteria: (i) the sectoral group to which each firm 
belongs, (ii) level of R&D experience (experienced vs. non-experienced firms), and (iii) firm 
size (large vs. SMEs). These criteria reflect the theoretical assumptions underpinning the 
research question. The high level of variety between cases is based on the most different 
design approach, and it was chosen in order to analyse variation in light of specific contextual 
influences. I aimed at focusing on a relatively large sample of around 20 cases (firms), in 
order to meet the selection criteria and also to improve the foundation of the analysis. In fact, 
according to Ragin and Amoroso (2011), analysis based on theoretical sampling improves 
with the number of observations of the specific phenomenon.  
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Although a few firms did not respond to my invitations, I eventually managed to get in 
contact with 20 firms that agreed to participate in the interview and also respond to the 
survey questionnaire. The distribution of these companies according to the three criteria 
noted above satisfactorily resembles the overall characteristics of the population of 
SkatteFUNN projects (see table 1 and figure 1 above). My final sample of selected case 
studies consists of 6 firms in the AKP sectoral group, 4 in the MPG, 3 in the SIS and 7 in the 
PGS types of sectors (each with 1 large firm). The latter group is slightly overrepresented in 
my sample as compared to the population. This was in order to attain a better balance 
between experienced (12 cases) and non-experienced (8 cases) R&D performers. I will 
discuss my findings with caution since they are not intended to be representative of the whole 
economy, but rather selected case studies intending to provide new insights on firms’ 
response to SkatteFUNN . 
 
5.2.2 Access to data 
Gaining access to the firms proved to be a challenging task. Not only was it time-consuming 
to identify firms that could be qualified as representative in my study, but also identifying the 
key respondent within the firm and establishing contact with that person was often difficult. 
Issues with gaining access to the case and informants are not uncommon, and are discussed in 
the literature (Thagaard, 2009).  
 
I relied on web-searches to locate both relevant firms and the respondents. After combing 
through examples of successful projects on official NFR websites6, I began a more targeted 
search, using the Google search engine to look for various combinations of “industries” and 
“+skattefunn”. Quite a few firms mention SkatteFUNN project approval on their company 
website newsfeed or annual reports. Others were identified in online industry publications 
and municipal reports on R&D. 
  
I expected firms to be a bit wary, since the phenomenon I am interested in is tax-related and 
can be considered a sensitive topic, so I took precautions to underline my purely academic 
interest. I feared that by contacting these firms from a private e-mail provider like g-mail, my 
request could easily have been halted in a spam filter, or been considered “less than serious”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  E.g. www.skattefunn.no and www.kunnskapsbrikker.no	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By reaching out to the firms through my NUPI7 e-mail account, I was hoping to borrow some 
of the institutes “gravitas” for my purposes. I contemplated asking SkatteFUNN to reach out 
to a selection of firms on my behalf, but after considering how an association with the 
program administrators could invite biased answers, I chose not to pursue this avenue. 
 
I was often able to identify the SkatteFUNN project leaders, but when I could not reach out to 
them directly I called the company switchboard, or got in touch through intermediaries, 
usually at the front desk. As recommended in the literature I kept my initial contact short and 
to the point, and followed up with a more detailed introduction letter (Yin, 2009) presenting 
the outline of my research project and the implications of participation. 
 
5.2.3 Presentation of cases 
In this section I provide a cursory presentation of the different cases. Since most of them have 
had several projects, and some are in the works, I will not go into project specifics. In an 
attempt to illustrate the outcome of the selection criteria, each case will be presented in 
relation to the expected conditions of their sector (following NACE8 designations), as well as 
firm specifics such as size, main activity and R&D experience. The firms are identified to 
increase the reliability of the study, and to better present the result of the selection process. In 
the analysis the various positions and experiences will be anonymised, in order to maintain 
confidentialities. 
 
The cases are presented in the same order as in table 2, arranged by sectoral group – 
following Castellacci`s (2008) taxonomy. The data set consists of 4 cases from the “mass 
production goods” (MPG) group, 3 cases from the “supporting infrastructure services” (SIS) 
group, 6 cases from the “advanced knowledge providers” (AKP) group and 7 from the 
“personal goods and services” (PGS) group. 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 NUPI stands for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and is the research institute where I have 
been conducting my thesis work, as part of an internship.	  
8 NACE stands for ”Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne” and 
is a European sectoral classification. Based on the SIC2007 codes used in Norway, I have chosen to present the 
sectors by NACE code at the two-digit aggregation level.	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Table 2. An overview of my sample 
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Mass production goods (MPG) 
 
Kebony Norge AS 
This medium sized firm is situated in the “manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork” sector, and has found its niche in the development of curing materials. Because of their 
level of production and reliance on chemical knowledge this firm shares MPG sectoral group 
traits. The wood and cork product sector has traditionally relied on acquisition of new 
knowledge, and has a low degree of cumulativeness associated with its knowledge base, but 
when you account for the opportunities presented by the union with chemicals, the level of 
R&D, as well as appropriability and cumulativeness is expected to be high. The firm did base 
its technology on acquired patents, but today they command their own R&D department and 
continuously improve and develop new products. They had already been engaged in R&D a 
few years before they applied for SkatteFUNN-support. 
  
Nordic Mining ASA 
This is a micro firm focused on the exploration for coal, minerals and ores, as well as mining 
operations and technology development. The scale intensive character of the sector and 
traditional reliance on knowledge and technology developed elsewhere place it in the MPG 
group of sectors. The company has no active operations pro tem., but are engaged in R&D 
and exploration. Since the company was founded in 2006 they have had on-going R&D. 
Some of this is in-house, but because of the small size of the firm they rely extensively on 
collaboration and contracted experts. 
  
Eramet ASA 
Eramet is from another sector with MPG characteristics, namely the “manufacture of basic 
metals”. They operate smelting plants in Norway for the production and sales of alloys and 
related products. This large firm has for over a decade built up a lot of competence, and the 
knowledge base of the sector in general is considered to be highly cumulative. Although the 
firms in this sector acquire a lot of their technology from upstream knowledge providers, they 
often have a lot of intramural R&D activity. They have had between 1-3 SkatteFUNN-
projects, and already had experience with R&D when they applied for their first. 
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Henriksen Mekaniske AS 
This firm has had very many SkatteFUNN-projects, and was also undertaking R&D before 
the tax-incentive was established. The NACE designation of “manufacture of fabricated 
metal products, except machinery and equipment”, represents another sector found in the 
MPG group. This medium sized firm is involved with scale intensive mechanical engineering 
of specialised equipment for ships and boats. Traditionally the sector shows a reliance on the 
acquisition of machinery and equipment, but this firm has relied mainly on intramural R&D 
and customer and user interaction.  
 
Supporting infrastructure services (SIS) 
 
Ansur Technologies AS 
This micro firm operate within the “telecommunications” sector and engage in R&D, 
operation and sales of solutions for telecom and satellite communications. This sector is 
representative of SIS group, and usually has a high level of in-house R&D. Furthermore, the 
means of appropriability employed are usually a balance of formal measures like patenting 
and copyrights, and the cumulativeness is considered to be high. This company has a lot 
experience with internal and cooperative R&D, and has a technological lead in several 
aspects of the industry. They applied for SkatteFUNN-support for the firm´s first R&D 
project, but both of the founders had extensive R&D experience from earlier endeavours. 
 
Telio Holding ASA 
Telio is a medium sized company also located in the “telecommunications” sector. However, 
their focus is on R&D, operation, and sales of voice over IP networks and IP-based telephony 
solutions. The opportunities offered by the ICT development in this area are good, and even 
though the sector is dependant on a lot of acquisition of external knowledge and technology, 
some intramural R&D is necessary to secure first mover advantage. The sector is found in the 
SIS category, and services from these sectors typically contribute to the dissemination of 
knowledge across the economy. The company has been doing R&D for over a decade, but 
only had a few SkatteFUNN projects. 
 
	    
	   50	  
Sporveien Oslo AS 
This is a large firm from the “wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles” sector. Their operation and R&D is both concerned with maintenance and 
acquisition of new technology, as well as improving their understanding of the industry and 
their users. The sector can be classified as a SIS industry, but is in the “physical 
infrastructure” sub-group, as opposed to the two “network infrastructure” cases above. The 
firm fits the traditional mold of the sector and place a greater emphasis on external sources of 
knowledge, but they have been doing some R&D, even though they didn´t classify it as such 
until their first SkatteFUNN project. In the sector, appropriability conditions are usually 
limited and the underlying knowledge is not considered very cumulative, but within the niche 
Sporveien is doing R&D the conditions are better. 
 
Advanced knowledge providers (AKP) 
 
Posicom AS 
Posicom is a technical solution provider in the “computer programming, consultancy and 
related activities” sector. This firm falls into the category of AKP, representing a group of 
firms that usually have a high level of technological capability. For over a decade they have 
developed, produced and marketed specialised information and communication systems, and 
have been able to diversify their product for different sectors. A typical trait for all of the 
AKP sectors is close cooperation with customers, and together with internal R&D, these 
sources of knowledge are at the top of Posicom´s list. They were engaged in R&D before 
they got their first SkatteFUNN project approved, but did not always define their work in that 
way.  
 
Catenda AS 
Established in 2009, Catenda is a small SINTEF spinoff in the “scientific research and 
development” sector. This NACE designation encompasses a broad variety of technologies, 
but this firm is mainly concerned with R&D of ICT solutions for the construction sector. The 
coupling of ICT with construction presents a high level of technological opportunities, and 
with a cumulative knowledge base and good appropriability condition the propensity to do 
R&D is high. This case shares the conditions of other AKP sectors. Their employees are 
almost exclusively researchers with prior experience and knowledge of the field, and in some 
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areas the firm is pushing the international knowledge frontier. The firm had R&D experience 
before they applied to SkatteFUNN. 
 
Abalonyx AS 
This firm is also part of the “scientific research and development” sector, but focuses on the 
development of graphene products and processes. This is a micro-firm that focuses on 
improving existing processes in order to produce new and improved products. 
Nanotechnology is still a very undeveloped field and is considered a high opportunity area in 
the literature. Furthermore, innovation in this field can be said to require R&D activity, as 
production at this stage is inseparable from laboratory activity. This firm had no R&D 
activity prior to their first SkatteFUNN project since that was the same year they started up, 
but the founder and small staff all had extensive R&D backgrounds. This firm can also be 
found in the AKP category, and is characterised by high cumulativeness and strategic means 
of appropriation, (i.e. a mix of secrecy and complexity of design). 
 
Induct Software AS 
Classified by NACE level 2 as situated in “computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities”, this company is another AKP type firm that advance the supporting knowledge 
base of other sectors. They develop and consult on their own methodology, embodied in a 
process oriented software solution. The ICT sector in general is traditionally characterised by 
high R&D intensity, good technological opportunities, and high cumulativeness. This firm 
have only had a few SkatteFUNN projects, but had extensive R&D experience before those. 
The most common approach to appropriation of intellectual property is strategic mix. In 
addition to ICT, this small firm relies on in-depth knowledge of the processes they advise on 
through their methodology, and have affiliations to world-renowned experts. 
 
Beerenberg Corp. AS 
This large firm has built its experience over a long period of time. It falls in under the “repair 
and installation of machinery and equipment” definition, and represent the AKP-M category. 
They have a long tradition of manufacturing, sales and maintenance of specialised supplies 
for the offshore sector, and began their R&D activity long before their first SkatteFUNN 
project. The high demand for technologically diverse specialised supplies offer a lot of 
opportunities, and the technical knowledge base required is considered highly cumulative. 
For this sector the use of patenting is a prevalent method of appropriability. As with the 
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AKP-S group, firms in the AKP-M category traditionally rely extensively on R&D in their 
innovative efforts.  
 
Medistim ASA 
This final advanced knowledge provider is conducting R&D, distribution and sales of 
medical equipment. The “manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products” 
designation, together with the technologies they are involved with, place them in the AKP 
group of sectors. With several decades of experience, this firm has extensive technological 
capabilities, and is in fact a world leader in some niches. The firm had extensive experience 
prior to their first SkatteFUNN project. High levels of reinvestment of turnover in R&D, 
extensive use of patenting and a high degree of cumulativeness are typical in this sector. 
 
Personal goods and services (PGS) 
 
Lindum AS 
This case is built around a medium sized firm in the business of waste management. Lindum 
engages in R&D on recycling of recovered materials, and the sectoral designation of “Waste 
collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery” place the firm in the PGS 
group of sectors. The sector has traditionally portrayed a low innovation activity, and the 
knowledge base of the sector is considered to have limited cumulativeness. Nonetheless, this 
firm was doing R&D even before they got SkatteFUNN support, and have their own R&D 
department with a diverse portfolio of projects. They see a lot of technological opportunities 
as virgin material becomes increasingly scarce. 
 
Nortura SA 
This large firm is situated in the “manufacture of food products“ sector, and belongs in the 
PGS group. These close-to-the-market sectors usually rely on the acquisition of knowledge 
through machinery and equipment. In this specific sector the knowledge base has 
traditionally been considered to be of limited cumulative quality, and appropriability efforts 
have mainly been based on formal measures. However, this firm has a diverse knowledge 
base, and has measures in place to identify, manage and develop this knowledge internally. 
They are working for a rational and efficient production, processing and marketing of their 
products, throughout the value chain. This firm has been engaged in R&D for many years, 
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long before SkatteFUNN was established, and they have several decades of experience to 
draw from. 
 
Nøgne-Ø Det Kompromissløse Bryggeri AS 
Concerned with the “manufacture of beverages”, this firm is also found in the PGS group, 
and traditionally the sector resembles the “manufacture of food products” commented on 
above. The firm is small, but has designated R&D personnel on staff. They had already 
begun their first R&D project on their own, but later got the same project approved by 
SkatteFUNN. In addition to conducting product related R&D, they focus on how they can 
adapt existing production equipment to work better with Norwegian raw materials. The sector 
is very mature and firms need to diversify their product in order to improve and maintain 
their market position. Innovation in intermediary products enables most of the opportunities 
in this sector. 
 
Halvors Tradisjonsfisk AS 
This is another micro firm in the “manufacture of food products“ sector. The firm is engaged 
in sales and processing of fish and fish products. As mentioned above, this sector is part of 
the PGS grouping, and the propensity to engage in R&D is expected to be low. Their first 
R&D project was supported by SkatteFUNN, and since then they have had several new 
projects with support from both NFR and Innovation Norway. Through a combination of 
traditional and new knowledge they have made innovations in its production process, in order 
to meet the modern consumer. Situated in one of the largest export sectors in Norway, this 
young firm has successfully introduced their products in the international market. 
 
Mediehuset Nettavisen AS 
This is a medium sized firm from the “publishing” sector. Their research is relatively 
exploratory, and is part of the blossoming field of “big data” that holds the promise of a lot of 
opportunities. The sector shares the characteristics of other PGS sectors, but the ICT related 
technology presents a bit higher propensity for internal R&D, as well as higher levels of 
appropriability and cumulativeness. They were partly engaged in similar projects before their 
first SkatteFUNN project, but did not define or understand them as R&D until they were 
introduced to the tax-incentive scheme. 
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Sørlandsbadet AS 
Is a medium sized firm registered in the “food and beverage service activities” sector. 
However, a lot of their operation is centred on recreation activities offered at their location. 
This is also where their R&D takes place, so the lone NACE designation is not an adequate 
indicator of the sectoral conditions for innovation this firm deals with. Nevertheless, both 
sectors are expected to provide much of the same conditions. The sector falls into the 
“service” arm of the PGS group, and is usually recipients of advanced knowledge. Even 
though opportunities, R&D intensity, appropriability means and cumulativeness are all 
considered to be low within the sector, Sørlandsbadet has had a successful SkatteFUNN-
supported R&D project, and has applied for support for new ones. 
 
XXLofoten AS 
This micro firm arrange tourism activities, conferences and seminars, and are thus located in 
the “sports activities, amusement and recreation activities” sector. This sector can be located 
in the PGS group, and is usually not active R&D performers.  
What little innovation that takes place in this sector usually comes from sources external to 
the firm. In this case the R&D is focused on the relationship between actors within relevant 
sectors, and can be considered a type of organisational innovation. Their R&D efforts also 
began with a SkatteFUNN project. 
 
5.3 Collecting the data 
 
In this section I will present my process of obtaining data. To prepare for the interviews, I 
relied on document analysis and carried out a few interviews with experts and policy-makers 
in Norway. The main data collection work consisted of two steps; first, I did a personal 
interview with each company of the selected sample noted in the previous section; secondly, I 
followed up these interviews with a survey that I e-mailed to the companies a few days after 
the interview, in order to check the reliability of their responses and refine some of the 
incomplete information I previously got from them. The data were collected between 
November 2013 and the middle of March 2014. 
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5.3.1 Preparation 
 
Contextual interviews 
In order to incorporate a different perspective and also to provide some context, I conducted 
two interviews with actors influencing the users of the SkatteFUNN scheme. One was held 
with two representatives from the SkatteFUNN secretariat, and one with two representatives 
from Nofas AS, a consultancy firm specialising in enabling R&D efforts in private 
companies. 
 
These interviews varied somewhat from the ones conducted with the users. They both lasted 
upwards of 60 minutes, and had a somewhat different structure. I wanted the conversation to 
cover the same topics and theoretical assumptions the users talked about, but I allowed for 
greater flexibility and was more willing to veer off topic. In this way the semi-structured 
form was less strict than for the case interviews. Since both of these actors were asked to 
make more complex assumptions about the contextual influences I was looking at, as well as 
comment on my working hypotheses, I chose to arrange my questions so that these “heavier” 
abstract ones were saved for last. This pyramid structure was used in combination with the 
funnel structure, where more sensitive questions also are reserved for the later stages of the 
interview (Dunn, 2010). 
 
By prompting for examples I tried to invite these actors to provide more narrative answers 
that could better illustrate their points, but confidentiality considerations limited this to some 
degree. The insights provided were none the less valuable, and contributed to a shift in the 
focus of my thesis. 
 
Document analysis 
As mentioned above, I relied in part on document analysis for preparing for the interviews, 
and I covered sources on the various users and their projects, as well as documents pertaining 
to the scheme itself. I relied extensively on online sources and found my material on 
company websites, industry journals, the Norwegian company registry, firm analysis 
providers, pamphlets and annual reports.  
 
Thagaard (2009, pp. 62) describes this process as “content analysis” of documents created for 
a different purpose than the research it is being used in. I followed this guideline and only 
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used publicly available documents, refraining from requesting more project-specific 
documents from the firms or the SkatteFUNN-secretariat. The information presented in the 
documents presents a lot of different aspects of the phenomenon under study, though not all 
can be considered relevant for the thesis. It did however provide a good background for the 
interviews by describing different opinions, settings and events, influencing the firms at 
different points in time (Thagaard, 2009; Yin, 2009). 
 
The analysis I performed was limited and only intended to make me better acquainted with 
the conditions of the firms and their take on their own R&D projects. Since I was aware that 
the texts might affect my perception of the firms and that they were produced within certain 
contexts and for specific purposes, I tried to read them critically (Yin, 2009).  
 
5.3.2 Step 1: Personal interviews 
In order to improve my understanding of the underlying conditions affecting the firms, I 
relied extensively on interviews with key personnel, such as General managers, R&D project 
managers and chief executive, technology, and financial officers. All informants had deep 
knowledge of their SkatteFUNN projects.  
 
Data collection through interviews is often the primary approach in qualitative studies 
(Punch, 2005) and can provide valuable insight into less tangible aspects of the unit under 
study. Thagaard (2009) highlights the ability of interviews to capture informants’ 
experiences, views and understanding of a phenomenon.  
 
By learning how the informants perceived their R&D situation, what motivated them to 
apply, and how they experienced the R&D process, I was hoping to get a better 
understanding of the conditions and motives that influenced their response to the tax-
incentive. 
 
Interviews can be structured in different ways and are very malleable in the face of different 
research projects (Kvale, 2007). For my interviews with the firms, or users of the scheme, I 
chose a semi-structured approach. This meant that the accompanying interview guide would 
not have to be followed “verbatim”. Instead I categorised primary and secondary questions 
by the topics I wanted to investigate. Even though the interviews were conducted in 
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Norwegian, the native language of all the respondents and myself, I took care to simplify the 
language used in my questions and provide examples where I needed to use more specific 
terminology. While the primary questions were meant to broach each topic, the secondary 
questions usually functioned as reminders for me and were occasionally used as prompts in 
case the conversation digressed too much off topic. Through the letter of introduction the 
informants had already been informed of the focus of my thesis and this helped to delimit our 
conversations. My approach opened up for informants to provide input on topics not pre-
determined in the interview guide, and for me to follow-up these if deemed relevant. This 
approach did, however, lead to slight variations in the focus paid to different topics from one 
interview to the next. Overall, the flexibility of the semi-structured interview made possible a 
more natural conversation between the informant and me, improving our rapport throughout 
the interview (Dunn, 2010; Kvale, 2007; Punch, 2005). 
 
Another design element aiming at improving rapport was to use a “funnel” structure for the 
line of questioning. By starting off with more general questions and saving the more sensitive 
ones for last, I tried to make the informant relaxed and comfortable. In this manner, I also 
attempted to get the informants to warm up by talking about their company history and R&D 
projects (Dunn, 2010). 
 
I prepared myself for the interviews by familiarising myself with the interview guide and 
checked it for shortcomings by testing it on a fellow student and my thesis supervisor. In 
addition, I sought to get to know the firms beforehand through cursory analysis of various 
documents – a process described in more detail in the next section. 
 
Conducting the interviews were a challenging and time consuming process. The interviews 
lasted for approximately 30 minutes, giving me room for 8-10 primary questions, a few 
follow-up questions, and some time to pursue random topics. Transcribing this took between 
6-8 hours for each. I estimate that I have spent nearly a month in total, traveling to and from, 
conducting and transcribing the interviews but the process provided me with rich and detailed 
insight into my 20 cases. 
 
In order to facilitate a favourable environment for the respondents I offered to conduct the 
interviews at their office or via phone. Although I preferred to conduct them face-to-face in 
order to better build and gauge the rapport between us, a few interviews were conducted via 
	   58	  
phone or video calls. This was a necessary evil that allowed me to study cases all across the 
country. Since I was unable to interpret body language and other cues for these interviews, it 
was harder to develop and sustain rapport. As a consequence of this, a more formal dialogue 
developed, and the interviews tended to have a shorter duration. 
 
I decided to use an audio recorder as my main tool for registering the data. By doing this I 
could pay better attention to the conversation, and I believe it helped me stay more critical. 
This was intended to improve the flow of the conversation, but I was also aware of the 
possibility that the informants might inhibit their responses. To counter this I assured the 
participants that I would keep the files secure, that I would be the only one listening to the 
recording and that they would be able to edit and approve the transcript. I figured that 
recording the interviews with my computer would be experienced as less obtrusive than 
having a recorder in the middle of the table. This also enabled me to record the interviews 
conducted by phone, as I used a VoIP software9 to make the calls. I was already using my 
computer to reference the interview guide, and I believe this measure helped reduce any 
potential inhibition. The use of a recorder was mentioned in the introduction letter, and I also 
secured verbal permission prior to the interviews. 
 
Several challenges of conducting interviews presented themselves along the way. 
Continuously checking the interview guide broke up the flow in the conversation, however, 
this improved after a few interviews as I internalised the questions and got a bit more 
confident in my role as interviewer. It also proved hard to keep to the timetable, as breaking 
the informant off from lengthy digressions could at times seem blunt and damage the rapport. 
Another issue is related to diffuse or partial answers. Here I felt it was difficult to prompt for 
a clear answer more than once or twice.  
 
In retrospect I saw that, as intended, the semi-structured approach allowed different topics to 
be illuminated with different emphasis across the cases. This, however, presented difficulties 
when I began considering comparison of my initial findings. The natural conversations I so 
strived to achieve also entailed unique contexts for the interpretation of the questions, so 
some of the answers might have been given under slightly different assumptions. In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  VoIP stands for “Voice over Internet Protocol” and enables voice communication over the Internet. I used the 
popular software “Skype” in combination with “Piezo” to make and record my calls. 
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secure more comparable data, where all respondents would have the same conditions for 
responding, I sent out a follow-up survey questionnaire. 
 
All of the interview guides are enclosed in Appendix A. 
 
5.3.3 Step 2: E-mail survey questionnaire 
In order to improve the level of comparability of the cases I decided on a more stringent 
method for the follow-up data collection. A survey questionnaire is defined as a quantitative 
method, as the focus usually is on a broader set of respondents. However, with my limited 
number of samples, my findings are not statistically significant, and cannot be used to 
generalise about the correlation between my variables; motivation, behavioural additionality, 
and R&D experience (Punch, 2005). It would have been interesting to perform a larger 
separate survey, but my findings were nonetheless useful for collaborating some findings 
from the interviews, and enabled me to dig deeper into selected topics of interest. 
 
The design of the survey resembles a strictly structured interview with pre-established 
questions and response options. I limited the questionnaire to 13 multiple-choice questions to 
ensure maximum participation. The survey was hosted on an encrypted online server and was 
provided by a trusted service provider. The estimated time it would take to answer the survey 
was 5 minutes, but most respondents spent between 7-9 minutes.  
 
The questions evolved around the theoretical assumptions that defined the topics in the 
interviews, but on a more focused area. The same assumptions informed the answer options 
with the additional influence of initial findings from the interviews. 
  
The first few questions were of a demographic nature and focused on the firms´ experience 
with R&D and innovation. The next 8 questions dealt with the stated goal of the R&D 
project, motivation for applying for public support and the level of behavioural additionality. 
Most of these last questions used a Likert-type scale where the respondents were asked to rate 
various options from low to high. In order to mitigate forced answers and self-promoting 
ranking most questions had an answer option equivalent to “not relevant”, or “unknown”. In 
addition to this each question had an optional comments field where the informant could 
elaborate their answers or register concerns with the options offered (Punch, 2005). 
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The questionnaire asked for information from different points in time, and I was wary of 
potential pitfalls with this approach, both in the design of the survey and in the analysis. 
Informants can have different recollection and perception of past events, they can be 
influenced by the actual outcomes when answering contra factual questions and have a 
tendency to present themselves in a more flattering light. 
 
My informants had already agreed to answer potential follow-up questions, but I still had to 
prompt several of them once or twice in order to get full participation. The prompting did not 
have any effect on the time spent on answering the survey. By means of respondent-unique 
access points to the survey I was able to tie interview- and survey data together. Though most 
of the survey results converge with findings from the interviews there were some intra firm 
inconsistencies that I kept in mind when analysing the data. 
 
The survey is presented in Appendix B. 
 
5.4 Reliability, validity and ethical concerns 
 
During the entire research project I have strived to remain critical and reflective of my own 
choices and actions, and how they might affect the validity and reliability of my research. 
Both validity and reliability are concepts that derive from quantitative research and 
evaluation, and has been adapted to qualitative approaches (Punch, 2005; Thagaard, 2009). 
However, the gist of the concepts remains unchanged.  
 
Some of the measures I have taken and considerations I have made have already been 
mentioned above, but here I will present the concepts in relation to my attempts to strengthen 
them throughout the thesis. I will also describe some ethical considerations that have shaped 
my research as some of these choices might have affected the reliability.  
 
5.4.1 Validity  
The point of considering and assessing validity is to ensure that the conclusions reached are 
logical and have been based on the analysis of appropriate data (Punch, 2005; Thagaard, 
2009). As advised in the literature (Punch, 2005, pp. 29), I considered the validity across four 
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dimensions; the validity of data prescribed that I critically selected my cases as well as what 
data I collected so that it reflected the phenomenon I was studying; to ensure overall validity 
I have strived to make the logic of my research sound, and easy to follow; by following 
logical deductions from theory and empirical data, I have worked to make the study reflect 
the actual phenomenon, thereby improving the internal validity; and in order to improve the 
external validity, or transferability of analytical generalisations, I have tried to provide a clear 
and structured line of argument in the analysis.  
 
In quantitative methods the external validity refers to the generalisability of the results, but 
this is neither the goal of, nor possible with, qualitative data. Instead, the consideration of 
external validity focus on whether the analytical observations made about the applied theory 
can be transferred from the studied cases to similar ones (Kvale, 2007; Thagaard, 2009).  
 
By applying several methods of collecting data for my cases I have attempted to increase the 
validity of the empirical results. It enabled me to compare different sources of information 
and identify convergences in these, on the patterns of variation between cases. Yin (2009, pp. 
114-15) calls this process triangulation, and argues that this is one of the advantages of case 
studies. A challenge associated with this, however, is that the sources of data must address 
the exact same phenomenon, and failure to ensure this might affect the reliability of the 
research (Ragin and Amoroso, 2011). I should mention that the firms have been represented 
by the same informants in both the interviews and surveys, but I believe that the different 
methods present different settings and conditions for the informant, and thus provide grounds 
for triangulation. 
 
5.4.2 Reliability 
Reliability of the study focus on how consistent the research is over time, and refers to how 
replicable the study is. This is challenging for a qualitative study where people´s opinions and 
perceptions form the basis of analysis, but I have none the less tried to describe the steps in 
my research by discussing my theoretical framework and the choices and processes for 
selecting, gathering and analysing my data (Kvale, 2007; Yin, 2009). These efforts to make 
my research transparent have hopefully strengthened the reliability of this thesis. 
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Furthermore, I have attempted to reduce the chance for errors and bias from both the 
informants and myself. Above, I have already identified several of the measures pertaining to 
the informants, but can add that the informants approved the transcripts of the interviews with 
few minor adjustments and clarifications. The interview and survey questions were designed 
to be neutral and when I first generated the survey questionnaire the Likert-type scaled 
answer options were randomly ordered.  
 
I have considered the implications of my own predispositions and interpretation of data as 
well as the fact that the data gathered from the informants do not necessarily reflect the exact 
situation of the firm, but their individual perception of it. In my interaction with the 
informants I tried to show my genuine interest in their projects, while still maintaining some 
degree of formality. This was a trade-off between the positive effect of a good rapport and the 
drawbacks of not being utterly objective. By keeping this in mind while organising and 
analysing the transcripts I believe I managed to compensate a bit where this was evident. 
 
One element that reduced the reliability of my thesis, somewhat, is the fact that I decided to 
anonymise the responses in order to maintain confidentialities. More on this in the following 
section. 
 
5.4.3 Ethical considerations 
Punch (2005, pp. 276-77) argues that, especially for qualitative research, ethical 
considerations should be made as the researcher is involved with real people. 
 
Since the phenomenon under study is of a sensitive nature involving firms’ attitudes to tax 
deduction and use of public funding, I insisted on anonymising the individual respondents 
and “who said what”. This was done to ensure the respondents that they could answer freely 
without fear of placing themselves or their firms in a bad light. Unfortunately this, together 
with the semi-structured interviews, makes it harder for others to recreate my exact research 
project (Ragin and Amoroso, 2011). I made sure all informants were well informed before 
consenting to participation, and I believe that the implications of my research will be just as 
beneficial for them as for myself and academia. 
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Moreover, I approached the firms as a university student and even though I used my NUPI 
affiliation to emphasise my academic intent and qualifications I do not believe I imposed any 
obligation to participate through my social status. One of the reasons I did not approach the 
SkatteFUNN secretariat and request that they act as an intermediary was exactly to avoid any 
power asymmetries. 
 
When it comes to more obvious ethical practice, pointed out by Ragin & Amoroso (2011, pp. 
81), I can attest to not having concealed any findings nor produced fictional data. In addition 
to this, I have strived to correctly refer to the work of those I have built my own arguments 
upon. 
 
5.5 Process of analysis 
 
Finding the appropriate way of analysing took a lot of time as there are many approaches and 
no-one is “right”. Punch (2005, pp. 194-95) points this out, and argue that it is important to 
guide the reader through the choices made in order to show how the conclusions were 
reached.  
 
The first step of my approach was to transcribe the interviews. Since this was done within a 
week of conducting the interviews the analysis did in fact begin long before I turned my full 
attention to it. Initial findings, not covered earlier in the thesis, prompted me to make follow-
up inquiries and to expand the theoretical framework.  
 
The data were not analysed following strict methods like discourse analysis, but consisted of 
a more pragmatic muddle of analytical techniques, dubbed “bricolage” by Kvale (2007, pp. 
115). I began organising the individual case data by coding the findings in spreadsheets and 
was able to categorise several codes under the topics I investigated. Out of these I focused 
mainly on two (“motivation” and “behavioural additionality”) that have particular relevance 
for my research question. 
 
Although the focus in the data gathering was to deep-dive into single units to better 
understand how the tax-credit was perceived in each case, the overarching research question 
was focused on what could explain the variation in response between the cases. By first 
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looking at each case isolated from the others I tried to make sure I would not miss any 
interesting findings. I added the survey data to the spreadsheet and by comparing my findings 
across cases I could identify differences and similarities. Some of these differences seemed 
contingent upon contextual influence I had controlled for, and in the last stage I investigated 
how existing literature could explain these findings (Baxter, 2010; Ragin and Amoroso, 
2011). 
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6 Results 
 
This chapter presents the results of my comparative case study analysis. I have structured the 
presentation in two main sections based on my two main dependant variables, and will begin 
by presenting how I found motivation to apply to vary between the R&D experienced and 
non-R&D experienced cases. The next section will address the variation in behavioural 
additionality benefits from the tax-incentive scheme. I will then discuss how my findings 
relate to extant theory on heterogeneity and how it complements the findings from the 
previous evaluation done by SSB some years ago.  
 
6.1 Motivation to apply 
 
To better understand what motivated the firms to apply I used a mix of direct and indirect 
questions, both open (in the interview) and specified (in the survey). Both in the interview 
and survey questionnaire the informants were asked to recall the motivation for applying for 
their first, as well as their latest, SkatteFUNN projects. In the interview setting these were 
also accompanied by questions pertaining to the necessity and expected relevance of the 
R&D project and what would happen if they didn´t get support. In the survey they were asked 
to rate nine alternatives (presented in table 3) from “not motivating” to “highly motivating”. 
To make the distinction very clear, I first asked about the motivation, or targets, of the project 
in general, before asking about the motivation for applying to the tax-incentive. 
 
I will begin by summarising some of the main patterns emerging from the survey. As 
indicated above, the survey results should not be interpreted as providing representative 
statistical evidence, since they refer to a limited sample of companies. It is however useful to 
report the average of some of the questions that I asked the firms in order to give an 
introductory overview of the main results. I will then discuss in further detail the findings of 
the personal interviews carried out with the same companies. 
 
When looking at the average ratings of all the cases, “development of new 
products/services/processes” stands out from the seven alternatives as the most common goal 
of the projects. However, by looking at the variance across experience with R&D, the 
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aggregated average only correlates with the general trend in the cases where firms had prior 
experience with R&D. For the non-R&D experienced cases “exploration of new 
opportunities” had the highest rating, and a few significant differences between the groups 
could be identified.  
 
When it comes to the motivation for applying for their first SkatteFUNN project the total 
average again correlates with the average from the R&D-experienced cases, by pointing to 
“reduction in the cost of the project” and “expansion the scale of the project” as the main 
motivators. By only looking at the average for the non-R&D experienced firms it is rather 
“completing the project faster” and “securing necessary funds to initiate the project” that 
share the highest rating. 
 
Even though controlling for R&D experience provides more nuances, these indications are 
still based on average patterns in a non-representative survey dataset, hence they should be 
interpreted with caution. To test my first hypothesis I look at the in-depth knowledge I have 
gained of the various cases, and compare them in order to identify more specific patterns and 
regularities in firms’ response to the SkatteFUNN scheme.  
 
Table 3. Motivation for applying to SkatteFUNN 
 
 
 
 
6.1.1 Experienced R&D performers 
Throughout the interviews firms with prior R&D experience emphasised cost reduction as 
thee major motivator for applying, something the results from the survey questionnaire 
support. Almost every one of these cases gave this motivation the highest rating, but the 
focus on cutting costs was explained in different ways. For many of the cases it was a 
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question of priority. In some cases projects that were deemed profitable would be initiated no 
matter what, whereas projects that were considered interesting but which had uncertain utility 
were more contingent on public support in order to be fully realised. 
 
“We apply for funding for some of our projects, but are only dependent on support for a few 
of these. We consider SkatteFUNN a type of financing that enables us to pursue projects with 
more uncertain market value, typically projects that mainly contribute to general competence 
building” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
“There is no doubt that SkatteFUNN makes us more able to pursue these types of pointed 
projects, that cannot be directly commercially exploited, but which have a clear relevance to 
our exploitation of technology” (Firm in the AKP group).   
 
In other cases the question of priority was not tied to the uncertainty of the project, but a 
short-term vs. long-term development trade-off. This was more prominent in the relatively 
young firms where the R&D efforts were focused on developing and improving products and 
services. Since these firms had to maintain operations to finance the further development of 
their products and services, only a limited effort could be invested in long-term development. 
In these cases the “cost reduction” seemed to be tied to a desire to expedite their R&D 
efforts. 
 
“When we started up we had to fight for every cent, and every order and while at the same 
time invest enough in the development of our technology to stay competitive … To be honest, I 
don´t know if we would have been here today if it were not for those funds”  Firm in the 
MPG group). 
 
“For a firm like ours it is a dilemma to find the right balance between short-term and long-
term development. If our focus is short-term, then we can improve our turnover by 
intensifying operations, and if we focus on long-term development we know we have to 
develop our product in order to win a larger market share. Without SkatteFUNN we would 
most likely have been forced to focus more on operation in order to stay afloat, and it would 
have taken us longer to grow” (Firm in the AKP group). 
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Some of the firms maintained that they were purely motivated by the effect of the tax-
deduction on the bottom line, and that they unconditionally would have conducted the R&D 
project without any limitations.  
 
“We are engaged in a lot of R&D and because of that SkatteFUNN has an obvious appeal. I 
think we can be cynical enough to say that we have used it solely to benefit economically from 
the tax-deduction” (Firm in the SIS group). 
 
This was justified by pointing out the extensive amount of investments they already had 
made in R&D, and that it would be “stupid not to apply” when the funds were available to all 
that met the SkatteFUNN criteria. Only a few of the experienced firms reported any other 
motivation for applying; one informant explained that they did not see the support as 
financial gain, but as a chance to do a better job; while another mentioned the goodwill it 
generated with top management, and that a SkatteFUNN approval could be used to build 
internal support for the project.  
 
“For the top management this type of support is always a plus. One is always cautious with 
innovation projects, because so many are money drains that do not lead to anything. So when 
you can point out that some of the money comes back as a tax deduction, support for 
initiating these types of projects increase” (Firm in the AKP group). 
 
Most of these projects would have been initiated regardless of the tax-incentive, but the 
support enabled them to finish the projects faster or to increase the scope of the project. This 
is also visible in the survey data where most of the firms that emphasise “reducing the cost of 
the project” also rate “expanding the scale” as a top motivator. 
 
6.1.2 Non-experienced R&D performers 
Both the interview and survey data revealed that also among the non-R&D experienced 
cases, some were highly motivated by the idea of cutting R&D costs. However, the top rating 
had a greater variability than for the experienced firms, and was spread out across five 
additional alternatives; conduct a more complex R&D project; reduce the financial risk; 
complete the project faster; secure necessary funds to initiate the project; and increase the 
internal support.  
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Some of the firms explained that in order to divert resources to R&D activities, the projects 
had to be of a certain size and ambition. A few even felt that they had to justify not just the 
resources directly related to the R&D efforts, but also the administration cost of applying and 
managing the SkatteFUNN project, as they feared that if the projects were too small it would 
diminish the value of the support. The resulting scope and complexity of the R&D projects 
entailed an unprecedented risk for the firms, and cutting cost became a motivation for 
applying for support in order to reduce the firms´ financial stake. 
 
As with most of the R&D-experienced firms, the motivations for applying did not “stand 
alone”. Firms replying that cutting cost or reducing the financial risk were main motivations 
for applying described situations in which they were unable to carry these burdens alone.  
 
“It was first and foremost to get the funding, because without SkatteFUNN we wouldn´t have 
survived - We would have been bankrupt” (Firm in the AKP group). 
 
“Limited resources and prioritisation were the main reasons we didn´t start up the project 
sooner … This changed when we saw that SkatteFUNN could give us the financial breathing 
room to hire a person that wouldn´t have to be concerned with short-term revenue, but could 
focus on long-term development … Our first R&D project wouldn´t have been initiated 
without the fiscal incentive provided by SkatteFUNN” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
“I would say that the main motivation was the financial support. It made it possible for us to 
initiate the project, which we otherwise wouldn´t have had resources to pursue” (Firm in the 
SIS group). 
 
Some of the firms explained that if possible they would annotate their internal project 
proposals “eligible for SkatteFUNN-support”, and were motivated to apply for support 
because they believed it would be easier to convince top management to get behind an R&D 
project once SkatteFUNN had approved it. 
 
“I thought that presenting the SkatteFUNN-opportunity would be a nice way to pitch the 
project for the upper management, which had made it clear that they did not want R&D 
projects to run at the expense of daily operations, and that it would have to be something we 
could achieve on the side line” (Firm in the SIS group). 
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The need for external resources is also reflected in the survey results, where firms that 
highlighted cutting cost or reducing risk as strong motivators also placed the same emphasis 
on securing necessary funds. For a few of the cases the project was fundamental for the 
establishment of the firm, but for most the R&D represented exploration of opportunities for 
improvement or branching out.  
 
6.1.3 Hypothesis test: motivation 
Although cost reduction was a more pronounced and consistent motivation for the R&D 
experienced cases, both groups articulated the desire for reducing the cost of their R&D 
project. However, the context that influenced this desire can be seen to vary with their 
experience.  
 
With the exception of the R&D experienced firms that reported that they would have 
completed the project within the same timeframe and with the same scope regardless of the 
tax-incentive, all the cases were faced with resource constraints to their projects. 
 
In the experienced firms the R&D-departments fought other departments for resources, and 
different R&D projects competed for a share of the budget. The constraints experienced by 
these firms seem to emanate from project specific attributes affecting its relative priority 
negatively. In other words, it appears not to be a question of whether or not to continue with 
R&D but rather which projects the firms are willing to invest in. 
 
In all these cases the projects would be initiated no matter what, but for most, the limited 
resources would force a reduction in the project scale or pace. Thus, it seems that the desire 
to cut project costs was in order to speed up the projects or increase their scale, relative to 
what would be possible with the available resources.  
 
For the inexperienced firms, on the other hand, the resource constraints were not so much 
related to the content of the R&D but were instead tied to the challenge of diverting resources 
away from secure income generating activities in order to invest in R&D. In these cases the 
firms were motivated to apply in order to reduce the cost of the R&D project enough to 
justify resource displacement from operation activities. Most of the R&D projects would not 
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see the light of day unless they got an influx of funds, and as such they were much more 
dependent on the tax-deduction than the R&D experienced firms.  
 
The various motives for applying appear to be in line with the first hypothesis. Since firms 
with prior R&D experience already have developed formal R&D capabilities, and usually 
come from sectors with highly codifiable knowledge and higher levels of technological 
opportunity, their motivations for applying differ from those of the non-R&D experienced 
firms, which usually are found in sectors where it is harder to capitalise on R&D, and lack 
formal R&D capabilities.  
 
Although there are a few exceptions the motivations for applying to SkatteFUNN are 
clustered on either side of the explanatory variable; reducing the project cost and increasing 
the scale and pace of the project as main motivators for the R&D experienced firms; and 
securing necessary funds to initiate the project as the main motivator for the non-R&D 
experienced firms. 
 
6.2 Behavioural additionality 
 
The results from my study of the changes in behaviour are based on the interviewees´ 
perception and experience, and corroborated by the survey questionnaire. Separating the 
additional effects from the support and the R&D in general is not an easy task, but I made the 
explicit distinction when I phrased my questions, both in the interviews and in the survey. 
The informants answered questions on whether the SkatteFUNN support had led to any 
“extra” benefits beyond the financial, and were probed about changes to strategy and 
routines. In addition, they were asked to rate the degree to which the support had contributed 
to thirteen different behavioural additionality effects, depicted in table 4. They could grade 
these effects at five levels from “no degree” to “very high degree”, as well as choosing a 
sixth option of “not relevant”. 
 
The total average from the survey questionnaire indicate that the strongest effects 
experienced were related to the expansion of the knowledge base and increased competence 
for those working on the project. Looking a bit closer, the average behavioural additionality 
reported by the experienced R&D performers strongly resembles the total average. On 
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average, the non-R&D experienced cases also rated increased competence as a top 
behavioural additionality, but tied with this effect was a stronger focus on R&D and a new 
innovation strategy. The latter was among the bottom rated for the experienced firms, 
separated by more than two scales. In fact, according to these averages, the non-R&D 
experienced firms reported stronger behavioural additionality for all of the effects. 
 
Table 4. Behavioural additionality effects. 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1 Experienced R&D performers 
The extent to which the experienced firms benefitted from behavioural additionality was 
usually limited to effects that improved existing processes and helped maintain focus. 
However, some could not identify any persistent changes to their routines or strategies that 
could be attributed to SkatteFUNN. 
 
“In general I don´t feel it has given us anything "extra"” (Firm in the SIS group). 
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A few of these cases believed they would have completed the project in the same way 
without the tax-incentive, so the absence of behavioural additionality can in some cases be 
traced back to a lack of input additionality. Others believed that since they already had well 
developed strategies and R&D capabilities, little could be gained from the SkatteFUNN 
support. 
 
“I cannot say that any of our routines or strategies have been affected by the scheme, but I 
think that is because of our starting point. We were very research- and innovation focused, 
and the way SkatteFUNN is organised has only been in line with our established practice and 
mind-set” (Firm in the AKP group). 
 
Some of the same firms did, however, experience positive effects that contributed to the 
improvement of the particular R&D project. 
 
“Some times we are too eager to apply for a project, and the application process has gone 
over two rounds before being approved. The feedback we receive upon the initial rejection, 
either from Innovation Norway or SkatteFUNN, have been valuable to the improvement of the 
project, and I must say the structure and process around SkatteFUNN is commendable” 
(Firm in the MPG group). 
 
“You can say that, when you design the SkatteFUNN application you have to describe and 
improve the processes and your documentation, which is beneficial since it challenges you to 
improve your project” (Firm in the AKP group). 
 
According to the SkatteFUNN representatives I interviewed, several firms find the 
application template so useful that they use it as a general R&D project template even for 
projects they have no intention of applying to SkatteFUNN for. There were also cases where 
firms apply for support to a wide array of projects only to use the feedback from Innovation 
Norway and the SkatteFUNN secretariat to select which projects to initiate. 
 
Several firms answered that the rules and regulations of the program enabled them to build 
more knowledge and improve their competence, by providing structure and improving their 
project routines. 
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“I would say that SkatteFUNN is providing some additional structure. You have to work out a 
lot of detail when you write the application, and you will try to structure the project in a 
similar way. These processes required by SkatteFUNN also make it easier for me to hand the 
projects over to other project managers, and provide instructions on what to report”. (Firm 
in the AKP group). 
 
“Without SkatteFUNN we would probably lack some of the pressure along the way. The 
reporting helps maintain a beneficial project focus” (Firm in the AKP group). 
 
“In a way, SkatteFUNN ensures that you treat the internal processes related to the project, as 
external – Something that can be very healthy” (Firm in the AKP group). 
 
In addition, some of the firms pointed out an image building effect, where SkatteFUNN 
support worked as a kind of “seal of approval” that was seen as conductive to increased 
expectation and involvement from management, and provided better conditions for recruiting 
competent personnel. Also worth mentioning is that one of the firms have adopted a more 
holistic approach to their R&D in an attempt to adapt to the design of SkatteFUNN and other 
R&D programs. 
 
The effects experienced here were typically improvements of existing routines, and were 
related to the documentation requirements in the application and reporting stages, and to 
some extent the process of applying. The findings from the interviews are supported by the 
survey results, which also made it easier to compare the relative benefits experienced. When 
forced to rate different effects, only a few of the firms responded that an effect was irrelevant 
or that SkatteFUNN had not contributed at all. Most of the experienced firms reported a low 
or moderate influence on all effects, with higher ratings for effects pertaining to knowledge 
and competence building, improvement in R&D focus and processes, and improved linkages 
with users, suppliers, competitors, or external R&D institutions. That the latter effect was not 
mentioned in the interviews is peculiar because the deduction cap has been twice as high for 
projects that are done in cooperation with approved R&D institutions. The omission might 
indicate that my questions did not captured this dimension, and that the firms view this as 
more than, or something completely different from, an “extra” effect of the support. It should 
be mentioned that even though the scheme provides stronger incentives for collaboration 
efforts, the results from the SSB evaluation showed that the effect was limited. 
	  75	  
6.2.2 Non-experienced R&D performers 
In the interviews with the inexperienced firms the source of the additionality seemed to hinge 
on the rules and requirements, although some also referred to the novel experience with a 
more formal way of learning.  
 
“SkatteFUNN help us get into the right mind-set - In a way it is like a positive straitjacket, 
that force you to contemplate every stage of a long and complex process. We would never 
have had ambitions at this level, because we wouldn´t have had the possibility to pursue them 
without the funding” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
“The first project wasn´t all that successful, but based on the experiences we made, our 
following projects turned out really well … The competence we acquired placed us in a 
stronger position for handling future R&D projects” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
Since many of the cases would not have engaged in R&D without the support, effects related 
to the R&D experience in general can in these cases be ascribed to the SkatteFUNN program. 
 
Several of the firms mentioned that the support helped them improve the way they conducted 
their R&D, both for the specific project and in the future, and that the program requirements 
forced them to collect more and better data. 
 
“It is clear that when you are forced to document the entire process of a SkatteFUNN 
supported R&D project, you are forced to reflect more thoroughly on certain aspects than 
without that structure. The alternative would likely have been a stronger reliance on 
serendipity, and we have probably improved our R&D processes and become more aware of 
the value of R&D as a result of our first project … I honestly believe that we have learned 
more because of the awareness the SkatteFUNN requirements entail” (Firm in the MPG 
group). 
 
Part of the new appreciation of formal learning processes seems to be tied to an increased 
awareness of their knowledge bases, and accompanying appreciation of knowledge as an 
important asset.  
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“It [SkatteFUNN] was a thorough introduction to that way of working. We also saw that in 
several areas our knowledge was limited at best” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
“You basically build a model for improving learning and knowledge absorption, and I believe 
you become more aware of your own knowledge, or lack thereof, and at the same time learn 
to appreciate those intangibles to a larger degree” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
“The acknowledgement that this type of deep knowledge attained by formal research projects 
is alpha and omega in product development can to a large degree be attributed to the 
imposed structure of the SkatteFUNN project” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
In some cases, the tax-incentive also reduced risk aversion among the managers. Both the 
reduced cost and the positive results from the first project contributed to this. 
 
“I believe that the doors we opened with our R&D project, have led to a higher tolerance for 
risk and uncertainty, among the top-management” (Firm in the MPG group). 
 
One of the less frequently mentioned effects was that in addition to the effect of the fiscal 
support on the pace of their projects, the fact that they had an engagement with a public actor 
with deadlines and reports helped create a "we-need-to-finish" mind-set. One firm also 
mentioned that even though not all of the top- or department managers seemed aware of the 
R&D effort initially, more and more began to show an interest, and that a more positive 
attitude towards R&D was slowly spreading over the course of the project. 
 
The interview data demonstrate that the main focus of the non-R&D experienced respondents 
have been on the development of new capabilities related to formal learning processes. 
Together with the thorough introduction to formal knowledge production the SkatteFUNN 
process represented, the increased appreciation of their extant knowledge and the rich and 
detailed knowledge R&D can produce were highlighted as particular strong effects. 
 
This can also be seen in the survey data, but in addition this data revealed many more 
behavioural additionality effects than those gleaned from the interviews. When grading these 
thirteen effects the two lowest ratings (no degree and little degree) were only afforded three 
times among all the inexperience firms. An important finding was that all of the non-R&D 
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experienced firms continued to perform R&D after this initial SkatteFUNN project and, as I 
will discuss in section 6.3.1, their motivation for applying for SkatteFUNN support to these 
latest projects have changed along with their behaviour.  
 
6.2.3 Hypothesis test: behavioural additionality 
The findings reveal that almost all of the cases experienced some behavioural additionality, 
but the different effects varied in strength across the explanatory variable of R&D 
experience.  
 
The R&D experienced firms felt the strongest effect on competence development and 
knowledge production through improvements to the project or minor changes to existing 
routines. The effects attributed to SkatteFUNN were usually linked to the documentation 
requirement in the application and reporting stage. However, some of these cases did not 
experience any effect at all.  
 
For the cases with no prior R&D experience the effects highlighted in the interviews were 
more fundamental, being associated with the formal process of R&D for the first time. Both 
the R&D experience in general and the requirements associated with the SkatteFUNN 
program contributed to an increased focus on, and appreciation of, the knowledge assets of 
the firm, and of R&D as a source of new knowledge. The processes prescribed by the 
SkatteFUNN requirements were a formative introduction to R&D routines for these 
inexperienced firms. 
 
Although two different patterns appear, the theoretical arguments of both propositions seem 
to hold. The R&D experienced firms able to build upon their existing knowledge, routines 
and competence, did experience their strongest effects in these very areas. The strong 
knowledge and competence building effects might be a sign of an accumulation effect, but 
the changes in routines were mostly limited to the duration of the project, which might 
indicate a persistent path dependence or a limited development potential intrinsic in the 
SkatteFUNN requirements. The catch-up potential of the inexperienced firms, on the other 
hand, allowed them to embrace new routines and mind-sets introduced through the 
SkatteFUNN project, and they underwent larger changes from a broader set of effects. 
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Although the evidence from the interviews indicates the group with the strongest behavioural 
additionality, it is difficult to compare the relative strength of their experiences. However, the 
survey questionnaire data supports the hypothesis that the inexperienced firms benefitted 
from a stronger behavioural additionality by providing the relative degree to which each of 
the firms experienced the different effects. With only a few exceptions, the sum of the 
behavioural additionality effects for each of the non-R&D experienced firms was higher than 
the respective sums of the experienced firms. In addition, the average of each of the thirteen 
effects was rated higher by the non-experienced firms. This leads us to conclude that 
hypothesis 2b is supported by the data, and that under the conditions of the SkatteFUNN 
program the catch-up potential of inexperienced firms is larger than the cumulative advantage 
held by experienced firms. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
 
6.3.1 Links between motivation (H1) and behavioural additionality (H2) 
The analysis in relation to the first hypothesis strongly indicates that firms´ response to a tax-
incentive varies across R&D experience, and that firms with previous R&D activity are more 
likely to apply for support in order to reduce the project cost, or to increase the scale of the 
project, while the inexperienced firms are more likely to be motivated to apply in order to 
secure necessary funds to initiate their R&D activity. 
 
As demonstrated, the R&D experience has affected the innovation capabilities of the firms 
through behavioural changes. Since the needs and desires that shape the motivation to apply 
are dynamic, and are assumed to change together with the conditions affecting the firm, e.g. 
capabilities, we can expect motivation to have changed more in the cases that experienced the 
strongest behavioural additionality. 
 
The data on motivation for applying after the initial SkatteFUNN project confirm this 
proposition. In the cases where the firms had no prior experience with R&D 86 % have 
changed their motivation after their first R&D project. In comparison only 38 % of the firms 
with previous R&D experience reported similar changes. 
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Drejer and Leiponen (2007) believed that the firm-level variation in capabilities was the main 
source of heterogeneity affecting innovation. If this variation in capabilities represents the 
strongest contextual influence on motivation, the motivation of the inexperienced firms 
should begin to resemble that of the experienced firms as they gain experience and develop 
their formal R&D capabilities. 
 
For later projects, the previously inexperienced firms´ motivation to apply began to resemble 
the experienced firms´ motivation, with respect to expansion of the scale of the project, 
reduction of risk, increase in the pace of the project and acquisition of necessary funds. 
However, at the same time they became more motivated to apply in order to conduct more 
technologically complex R&D, build internal support, and to gain access to counselling and 
support. All of which, together with a weaker motivation for cutting project costs, increased 
the difference in motivation between the two groups. 
 
These discrepancies in convergence after the R&D experience and resulting capability 
development indicate that either the variation in capabilities is not the only source of 
heterogeneity, or that other factors influence the potential scope of opportunity to develop 
capabilities. The requirements of the SkatteFUNN scheme might represent a limited external 
“nudge” for experienced firms to branch their capabilities or for inexperienced ones to 
develop capabilities. It is reasonable to assume that the SkatteFUNN experience has most to 
offer in terms of formal R&D capability development. That is, formal search and problem 
solving processes associated with the STI-mode of learning – an approach that usually 
produce highly codified know-what and know-why knowledge. Even though both groups 
now had some level of STI-mode capabilities, the total variation in capabilities could still 
have a strong affect on the groups’ motivation. 
 
6.3.2 Sectoral heterogeneity 
As noted above, the firms that I have interviewed have developed their competencies and 
routines in response to different experiences and their capabilities are thus path dependant. 
An indication that industry-level heterogeneity could be at play is the correlation of R&D 
experience with the sectoral group-identity for the cases. All but one of the inexperienced 
firms were found in PGS or SIS sectors, and only two PGS firms reported prior experience 
with R&D. This strong pattern suggests that sectoral conditions pertaining to technological 
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opportunities, complexity, risk, appropriability conditions and cumulativeness might have 
contributed to the development of widely different capability-sets, influencing firms´ 
response to the tax-incentive.  
 
The inter-sectoral heterogeneity literature emphasises that the competitive environments 
related to the maturity of a technology, as well as attributes of the knowledge bases relevant 
to different sectors, produce a systemic variation in mode of innovation (Castellacci, 2007; 
Malerba, 2005; Pavitt, 1984). Evidence of intra-sectoral variation has been used to criticise 
this view, and to argue that firm-level factors explain the observed variety (Drejer and 
Leiponen, 2007). However, the concepts of inter- and intra-sectoral heterogeneity are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (Clausen, 2013; Peneder, 2010). According to the firm-level 
theory on dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 1994), firms strive to adapt their 
capabilities in order to exploit the opportunities offered by the environment they are situated 
in, in order to gain competitive advantages – an environment that to a large degree is defined 
by more or less dynamic and static attributes of the sector they are engaged in. 
 
The limited convergence in motivation after the initial SkatteFUNN project, and the 
correlation between R&D experience and sectoral group-identity, lends support to the 
conclusions reached by Claussen (2013) and Peneder (2010) that the observed heterogeneity 
is caused by an interplay of firm- and industry-level influences. The opportunities and 
constraints provided by the sectoral context influence the way firms organise their innovative 
activities (Castellacci and Lie, 2014). 
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7 Conclusions 
 
The objective of this thesis has been to extend our understanding of the patterns and effects 
of R&D policy by studying how and why firms´ response to R&D tax-incentives varies 
depending on firms’ characteristics and sectoral conditions. Following a presentation of the 
Norwegian tax-incentive scheme, SkatteFUNN, and the industrial context it is embedded in, I 
reviewed the theoretical foundations of innovation policy, and the recent evaluation literature. 
After criticising the extant evaluations’ lack of attention to the heterogeneous behaviour of 
firms, and consequently the important dimensions of the effectiveness of the scheme, I 
discussed some theories that contribute to clarify the concept of heterogeneity and its 
importance when analysing firm behaviour and market dynamics. These theories on how 
properties of knowledge and learning lead to firm- and industry-level heterogeneity enabled 
me to develop my theoretical arguments and focus my attention on two of the dimensions that 
have largely been neglected in extant literature: the motivation to apply to fiscal incentives 
schemes; and the behavioural additionality effects experienced by the companies. 
 
Arguing that “prior R&D experience” is a suitable explanatory variable to catch firms’ 
variation in technological capabilities, mirroring the relevant firm- and industry-level 
conditions influencing heterogeneous firm behaviour, I formulated two hypotheses to further 
my investigation of the variation in firm response to SkatteFUNN. The first (H1) hypothesis 
is that R&D experienced firms are more likely to apply for the tax-incentive in order to 
reduce the costs of their projects or to expand their scale, while non-R&D experienced firms 
are more likely to apply in order to secure necessary funds to invest in R&D for the first time. 
This is expected because the two groups differ in terms of R&D capability and related sunk 
costs, and hence have different levels of opportunities to capitalise on R&D. The second 
hypothesis leads to two contrasting propositions. One (H2a) suggests that because 
experienced R&D performers already have developed formal R&D capabilities, and will be 
able to take advantage of the cumulative character of knowledge and learning to build upon 
prior success, they will likely experience the strongest behavioural additionality affects. By 
contrast, the alternative hypothesis (H2b) argues that because non-R&D experienced firms 
are likely to lack any formal R&D capabilities, and have a larger potential to catch-up and 
develop easy to imitate capabilities, they will arguably experience the strongest behavioural 
additionality effects.  
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In the empirical part of the thesis, I conducted a comparative case study of a selected sample 
of Norwegian firms. I conducted personal interviews and gathered e-mail survey data from 
20 firms that had completed R&D projects with SkatteFUNN support in recent years. These 
were selected in a two-step process; (1) first I generated a sample of 150 firms from the total 
population of SkatteFUNN beneficiaries; (2) then I selected a representative sample of firms 
according to three selection criteria: (i) sectoral group, (ii) level of prior R&D experience, 
and (iii) firm size.  
 
Based on the informants’ experiences and explanations, I identified strong similarities and 
differences across the explanatory variable of R&D experience, and found empirical support 
for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2b. Firms that already had prior experience with R&D when 
they applied to SkatteFUNN were more motivated by cutting the cost, and increasing the 
scale and pace of their projects. On the other hand, the inexperienced firms, which described 
stronger financial constraints to their R&D ambitions, were more motivated by securing 
necessary funds to initiate their R&D projects. In line with hypothesis 2b, I found that the 
catch-up potential of the inexperienced firms was stronger than the advantage of 
cumulativeness held by the experienced R&D performers, and consequently that the 
behavioural additionality was strongest for the non-R&D experienced firms. 
 
In my dataset, the firms´ response to the tax-incentive varied systematically with R&D 
experience, because they were subject to different firm- and industry-level conditions, 
affecting their behaviour heterogeneously. The change in motivation observed after the firms 
gained R&D experience indicate that both variation in capabilities and sectoral conditions 
influence firms’ response. 
 
This study has provided qualitative support for the proposition that heterogeneous firm 
behaviour affects firms´ response to R&D policies such as the SkatteFUNN tax-incentive, 
which implies that R&D policy makers cannot continue to assume that firms are 
homogeneous actors and need to design their schemes and carry out the relative evaluations 
with a due consideration to firm heterogeneity.  
 
While the qualitative approach has provided a deep perspective on how the different firms 
experienced their R&D situation and the tax-incentive, the limited sample in my study makes 
it of course hard to generalise from patterns discovered in my findings. Although it is 
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important to interpret these results with the due caution and not generalise from them, it is at 
the same time important to conclude by discussing some possible general implications that 
the research presented here, if corroborated by future research, would have for the future 
design of innovation policies. 
 
7.1 Is the SkatteFUNN programme effective? 
 
SkatteFUNN is a cap-limited volume-based tax-incentive that was designed to be a more 
neutral R&D incentive. It is considered to be a “catch-all” instrument, directed at firms from 
all sectors, and of all types and sizes. It can, however, be questioned if this is an optimal 
approach for reaching the objective of increased social welfare. 
 
The DFØ evaluation of SkatteFUNN was mainly focused on the formative aspect of the 
policy, i.e., the effectiveness of the implementation and execution of the scheme (DFØ, 
2006), whereas the SSB evaluation was mainly focused on the summative aspect, i.e., the 
impacts and results of the tax-incentive (Cappelen et al., 2008).  
 
The findings from the SSB evaluation show that the additionality effects varies between 
sectors with high and low R&D propensity, with size, and with R&D experience. However, 
they made limited efforts to consider the appropriateness of the means, in other words, how 
the varying results influence the ability of the policy to mediate present failures, and to 
generate a net increase in social welfare. 
 
This could be a result of a narrow interpretation of the mandate to focus on the attainment of 
the project goals; increasing private R&D investment; generating innovation; and stimulating 
knowledge based value creation in Norway. 
 
7.1.1 Addressing Market and non-market Failures 
 
As firms’ needs and desires reflect their underlying conditions, the motivation to apply for a 
tax-incentive provides a good perspective on which failures might be present.  
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It seems likely that the inexperienced firms that were motivated by a need to secure necessary 
funds were suffering from financial market failure. Several of the firms mentioned that 
looking for financial sources outside the firm was out of the question since it would require a 
better top- and bottom line than they had. It was also considered too costly as it might entail 
giving up some of the control of the firm and “paying out of the nose” to regain control at a 
later stage. All of these firms, that would not have engaged in R&D without the support, can 
attribute their additionality to the SkatteFUNN support, but did not necessarily suffer from 
underinvestment caused by indivisibility or appropriability challenges of knowledge, 
associated with what is typically defined as knowledge market failure.  
 
The experienced firms I talked to cannot be said to have suffered from this type of financial 
market failure, but several mentioned that part of the motivation for applying was to reduce 
the financial risk associated with R&D projects with uncertain profits. The support enabled 
them to increase the scale or pace of these low-priority projects, and as a result more R&D 
was performed per year, likely affecting the output of knowledge in a positive manner. 
However, this increase in R&D did not necessarily involve any additional R&D investments 
from the firms. Although none of the cases articulated concerns about the public character of 
the knowledge they sought to develop, there certainly where cases with underinvestment in 
R&D associated with uncertain returns of investment. In the cases where the firms would 
have completed the exact same R&D within the same timeframe without the tax-incentive it 
is difficult to argue for the existence of additionality effects, and consequently not any market 
failure correction either. 
 
Behavioural additionality is a more complex concept, and it relates not only to the failure of 
markets, but also to systemic failures. In a study involving only treated firms it is difficult to 
say anything beyond the effect on the firms themselves, but it is not unrealistic to assume that 
in cases where the R&D has involved interaction with actors external to the firm, also firms 
that were not treated directly experienced behavioural additionality. The non-R&D 
experienced firms could be considered to have suffered under “capability or learning 
failures” where, in addition to the financial resource constraints, the limited experience with 
formal search and knowledge production might have constrained them from engaging in 
R&D sooner. None of the goals of the SkatteFUNN program are focused on system failures, 
but the introduction to formal methods of learning through R&D is in line with the goal of 
“stimulating knowledge based value creation in Norway”. 
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The aim of the public intervention attempt to correct the underinvestment in R&D is not just 
to improve the situation of the individual firm, but also to increase the social welfare. 
 
7.1.2 Increasing Net Social Welfare 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2.1 and 2.2 the development of the Norwegian industry structure 
and support system has resulted in a specialisation pattern where a relatively small part of the 
industry relies on R&D as a driver for economic growth. The Norwegian firms constitute a 
diverse industry structure that based on distinctive conditions has different needs and 
motivations, and, as my findings indicate, firms’ response to the tax-incentive differs 
accordingly. 
 
The R&D experienced cases, that mainly came from the AKP and MPG sectoral groups that 
provide the rest of the economy with knowledge, were mainly motivated by cutting costs or 
increasing the scale of the project. The inexperienced firms came from the SIS and PGS 
groups that traditionally are knowledge recipients in the knowledge production value chain, 
and were rather motivated by initiating R&D. When the firms, with these characteristics, are 
motivated as such it carries implications for the aggregate output of the scheme. 
 
The results from the SSB evaluation of SkatteFUNN reflect these motivations when they find 
that firms with little previous R&D experience drove the input additionality, and that the 
output additionality was strongest in R&D intensive sectors. 
 
In their evaluation, SSB pointed out that the particular output generated by the scheme, 
process- and new-to-the-firm product innovation, was not expected to generate large external 
effects. However, they did not mention that the inexperienced R&D performers often come 
from sectors with fewer opportunities to capitalise on R&D, and thus would likely generate 
less output. Nor did they comment on how the distribution of effects limited any potential 
synergy effect between the additionalities. Instead of regarding the effects in relation to the 
groups of firms that experienced them, they used the average to conclude that the scheme 
mainly works as intended.  
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By applying a similar line of argument as Castellacci and Lie (2014), we see that 
SkatteFUNN can be considered inefficient in light of the overarching goal of increasing the 
social welfare. 
 
Since the input additionality was found to be weaker in R&D intensive sectors the 
incremental effect on innovation output will consequently be limited. The stronger input 
additionality experienced in the low-R&D sectors should, following neo-classical 
assumptions, lead to a corresponding increase in output, but since these sectors are presented 
with fewer technological opportunities the input additionality had a limited effect on 
innovation output. Likely coloured by this, the R&D intensive sectors were found to have 
relatively stronger output additionality than the low-R&D sectors despite the limited 
stimulation of private investment among these firms.  
 
In addition to the limited output generated by the scheme, the aggregate spillover effects of 
the tax-incentive can also be considered to be low. For the R&D intensive sectors the types of 
innovation the support generally stimulated have a limited externality effects. Whereas the 
output from the low-R&D sectors have a limited spillover potential because they usually are 
recipients, not producers of knowledge, and their products and services are seldom used as 
intermediaries in further value creation. 
 
When all that is said, it is important to consider positive impacts of the tax-incentive on 
economic growth. As mentioned, the support is especially beneficial for SMEs, and 
SkatteFUNN sustains the innovative activities of many of these. This is beneficial for other 
complementary policy goals, such as increasing entrepreneurship and market competition. 
The positive impact on economic growth should also be seen in combination with other 
programs. Even though there still is far to go, the innovation policy instruments are 
increasingly designed to work together. Different programs from both the NFR and other 
actors, such as Innovation Norway, complement each other, and in several cases SkatteFUNN 
support is a requirement for approval from other programs (e.g. the IFU and OFU 
programs10). Another important objective towards increasing economic growth is the 
introduction, or education, SkatteFUNN represents for inexperienced R&D performers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  IFU is a program for industrial research and development contracts, and OFU represents the equivalent for 
public contracts. Both are administered by Innovation Norway.	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Hopefully, they graduate from this “low-threshold” program, and escalate their R&D efforts 
with more advanced support programs. 
 
7.2 Policy Implications 
 
The different capability-sets and sectoral contexts firms operate under generate different 
needs and motivations for applying to a tax-incentive and affect the possible effect of the 
support. The different responses to the SkatteFUNN program indicate that the homogeneous 
“catch-all” approach of the policy has a limited effect on reaching the social objective of 
increasing the social welfare. 
 
This study has demonstrated the importance of considering heterogeneity when designing and 
evaluating R&D policy. As argued, in the case of SkatteFUNN, neglecting to acknowledge 
this can have large repercussions for the effectiveness and appropriateness of the program. 
One implication carried by this study is that policy makers should move away from the 
assumption that firms are homogeneous actors, and should re-evaluate current designs that 
are based on this. Furthermore, an explicit target of future evaluations should be to consider 
the ability of the policy to mitigate failures and increase the social welfare. 
 
In order to increase the efficiency and impact on the social welfare, SkatteFUNN would not 
necessarily have to make very large adjustments. The scheme already differentiates between 
SMEs and large enterprises, as well as private and collaborative endeavours with approved 
R&D institutes. Without limiting its broad reach, the program could for instance be revised to 
target specific motivations, or levels of experience with R&D, apparently conductive to 
specific outcomes. 
 
Inexperienced R&D performers, likely to suffer from financial market failure, seems to 
benefit from the volume-based scheme used today, but could benefit from increased follow-
up in the commercialisation phase of their R&D. A continuation of todays design, coupled 
with counselling, would continue to help them establish R&D activities and develop STI 
capabilities and could also improve the “output-opportunity” realisation margin.  
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The approach to experienced R&D performers, on the other hand, should be adapted to 
incentivise a larger input and output additionality. Since these firms often are located in 
knowledge providing sectors with a lot of technological opportunities and strong spillover 
potential, a targeted policy would be beneficial for the overall production of knowledge. A 
minor adjustment could be to increase the deduction cap, and consequently the marginal rate 
of return, for firms that can demonstrate persistent R&D activity. To some extent, this is 
happening already as the caps on the scheme were raised both in 2009 and 2014. However, 
this was done for all firms equally, and the potential maximum benefit from the tax-incentive 
is still limited compared to the R&D budgets of many of our largest R&D performers. 
Another approach could be to introduce flexible incremental-based tax-incentives for these 
firms, ensuring that the support leads to increased private investment in R&D. 
 
While supporting the recommendation of Castellacci and Lie (2014); that in order to design 
programs better suited to further the national technological frontier and increase social 
welfare, policy makers should consider sector specific conditions, I also acknowledge the 
interplay between the firm- and industry-level, and agree with Clausen´s (2013) 
recommendation that even though they provide particular contexts, not even sectors should 
be considered to consist of homogeneous actors. 
 
Controlling for heterogeneity at the industry- and firm-level might even represent a step 
towards a more holistic policy design and evaluation tradition. Innovation is seldom 
something that happens is the vacuum of a single firm, but through an interplay of firm-, 
industry-, and national-level influences. As Arnold (2004) argues: in a world where we think 
of innovation in a system perspective, we need to evaluate on a system-level as well. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix A1 – Interview guide firms 
 
1. Drev dere med forskning og utvikling før dette prosjektet? 
Kjerneaktiviteten (før og nå)? 
Kunnskapsbase 
 
2. Hva har vært de viktigste kildene til deres innovative aktivitet? 
Intern eller ekstern FoU 
Vertikalt eller horisontalt samarbeid (leverandør/ konkurrent) 
Utstyr og materialer 
Brukere 
Offentlig forskning og universiteter. 
Design og utvikling 
Intern produktutviklingsavdeling. 
 
2. Hadde dere noen tidligere erfaring med offentlige støtteordninger? 
 
3. Hvordan ble prosjektet unnfanget, og hva var motivasjonen for å gjennomføre det? 
Utvikling av ny teknologi 
Videreutvikling av eksisterende teknologi 
Utvikle teknisk kompetanse 
Bedre teknologisk posisjon 
Bygge nettverk 
Løse spesifikt problem 
Bedre omdømme 
 
4. Hvorfor ble ikke dette prosjektet startet opp tidligere? 
Knappe ressurser (kunnskap, finans, kapasitet) 
Prioritet 
 
5. Hvor viktig var SF-prosjektet for bedriftens hovedaktivitet? 
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6. Hva var motivasjonen for å søke om SF-godkjenning? 
Sikre oppslutning om prosjektet 
Sikre midler til å gjennomføre prosjektet 
Å motta skattefradrag / kutte kostnader ved prosjektet. 
Øke omfanget på prosjektet 
Dele den iboende risikoen ved FoU. 
Rent innovasjonsfokus 
 
7. Hva hadde skjedd hvis dere ikke hadde fått godkjent prosjektet? 
Gjennomført prosj. u. endringer, samme omfang og tidsskjema. 
Gjennomført med samme omfang, men på et senere tidspunkt. 
Gjennomført prosjektet, men i mer begrenset omfang. 
Utsatt prosjektet på ubestemt tid 
Henlagt prosjektet 
Outsourcet prosjektet 
 
8. Hva var det viktigste bidraget fra SkatteFUNN-støtten? 
 
9. Har SkatteFUNN prosjektet gitt dere noe ekstra, utover det økonomiske? 
Endring i bedriftens rutiner som resultat av prosjektet? 
Hvor viktig var nettopp støtten for disse endringene? 
 
10. Fikk dere alle kostnadene godkjent?  
Har dere vært fristet til å føre ekstra timer og kostnader inn i prosjektregnskapet? 
 
11. Ført til økonomisk støtte siden? Fra hvem?  
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Appendix A2 – Interview guide SkatteFUNN 
 
1. Målsetning med ordningen, kun stedfestet i Str.mld.? Hvordan måles måloppnåelse?  
 
2. Reaksjon på funn fra evalueringene? Endring i ordningen i etterkant? (f.eks. sjekklister, 
rutiner, uformelle krav, eksterne fagpersoner, forskrifter, etc.)? 
 
3. Følelse av dagens situasjon? 
 
4. Diskuter midlertidig funn fra mine intervjuer. 
 
5. Brukerene, og bedriftene som driver med innovasjon i Norge som sådan, er jo ikke en 
homogen masse. Forskjellige kunnskapsbaser og evner, teknologiske regimer med varierende 
kilder til innovativ aktivitet, forskjellige teknologiske muligheter, approprieringsmuligheter, 
og grad av kumulativitet for kunnskapsbasen.   
 
6. Vi vet jo at tilbøyeligheten til å drive med intern FoU varierer med sektortilhørighet. 
Hvordan oppleves denne fordelingen i søkermassen? 
 
7. Dere følger jo ESA krav om klassifisering av Industriell Forskning vs. Eksperimentell 
Utvikling. Opplever dere en skjevhet i sektortilhørighet her? 
 
8. Aktuelt å tillate mer innkjøp av maskineri og utstyr for visse sektorer? 
 
9. To argumenter for denne typen støtte; Markedssvikt (risikofordeling og 
approprieringsvansker) og Finansmarkedssvikt (dyr ekstern kapital). Disse utfordringene gjør 
seg jo gjeldene i forskjellig grad for forskjellige bedrifter. (Store og små). Opplever 
SkatteFUNN, med sitt hovedfokus på SMB´er, at disse utfordringene er representert ulikt i 
forskjellige sektorer?  
 
10. Opplever dere at noen variasjon i bedrifters motivasjon for å søke om støtte? Eller uttalte 
konsekvens dersom godkjenning ikke innvilges? 
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11. I følge årsrapportene deres er det mange tilbakevendende brukere, har dere utarbeidet 
noen statistikk over fordelingen her, etter bransjer / sektorer? 
 
12. Kan jo være vel så viktig i det lange løp, som å få til et vellykket prosjekt – Hva er deres 
målsetning rundt endring i rutiner og adferd (behavioral additionality)? 
 
13. I lys av utfordringer ved å måle endring i rutiner og adferd, hvordan får dere innblikk i 
denne effekten av SkatteFUNN? 
 
14. Dere samarbeider jo med resten av virkemiddelapparatet. Opplever dere at mange 
begynner i SF og utvider sin FoU aktivitet etter det? Sektorer som utmerker seg? 	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Appendix A3 – Interview guide NOFAS 
 
1. Rådgivning er jo et bredt begrep. Kan dere fortelle meg litt om omfanget av tjenestene dere 
tilbyr? 
Direkte teknisk FoU-personell (med utplasserte spesialister)?  
Utforming av prosjekt (m hvilket utgangspunkt)?  
Praktisk info (rigid regelverk og krav, identifisere nytte, tungrodd prosess etc.)?  
Kommunikasjon. m IN, SF, R & LE (Avklaringer, prosjektrapporten)?  
Søknad?  
Prosjektregnskap? 
 
2. Hvis vi bare fokuserer på SkatteFUNN – Hvorfor benytter bedrifter deres tjenester? Hva er 
deres motivasjon? 
Hvordan vil du beskrive deres typiske kunder? 
Noen bransjer som utmerker seg? (High-tech / low-tech). 
Nye for FoU? 
 
3. Varierer typen rådgivning kundene ønsker?  
Etter bransje? 
Etter erfaring? 
 
4. Variasjon i typen prosjekter fordelt på forskjellige bransjer?  
Forskning eller Utvikling? 
Mange som samarbeider med forskningsinstitusjons? 
 
5. Virker det som om bedriftene er åpne om egen motivasjon for å søke SF? 
Hva er den vanligste motivasjonen?  
Sikre oppslutning om prosjektet? 
Sikre midler til å gjennomføre prosjektet? 
Å motta skattefradrag / kutte kostnader? 
Dele den iboende risikoen ved FoU? 
Rent innovasjonsfokus? 
Bransjer som utmerker seg? 
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6. Det er påvist gjennomsnittlig høyere prosjektkostnader i SF enn andre FoU prosjekter. Har 
dere noen ide om hva som kan forklare dette?  
Kan det ha noe med erfaringsnivået på bedriftene? 
Kan det handle om usikkerhet rundt hva som kan fradragsføres og under hvilke 
poster?  
 
7. Er det mange prosjekter som må endres for å møte SF sine krav?  
Årsak? Svake prosjekter, eller dårlig informerte bedrifter? 
Eksempel? 
 
8. SSB peker på positive adferdsaddisjonalitet og ca. 3/5 tilbakevendende bedrifter. Har dere 
mange "returning customers"?  
Bransje? 
Erfaring? 
 
9. Opplever du at tilbakevendende kunder har utvidet sin FoU aktivitet etter sitt første SF-
prosjekt? (For eksempel økt omfanget eller antall prosjekter, flere kilder til støtte, 
org.struktur, FoU-ansatte, strategi etc.) 
Varierer dette mellom bransjer (high low)? 
Endres da bedriftenes behov for rådgivning? 
 
10. Har dere noen tanker rundt prosjektet, som jeg ikke har spurt deg om? 	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Appendix B – Survey questionnaire 
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Appendix C – Sectoral grouping 
 
Castellacci´s (2008) taxonomy covers the traditional manufacturing and service sectors, but 
excludes typical public sectors, like “water collection, treatment and supply” and 
“education”. The following list of sectoral groups and corresponding sectors is based on the 
referenced 2008 paper. 
 
Advanced knowledge providers (AKP): 
Computer and related activities; research and development; other business activities; 
machinery and equipment; medical, precision and optical instruments. 
 
Mass production goods (MPG): 
Chemicals; office machinery and computers; electrical machinery and apparatus; 
radio, TV and communication equipment; rubber and plastic products; other non-
metallic mineral products; basic metals; fabricated metal products; motor vehicles; 
other transport equipment. 
 
Supporting infrastructure services (SIS): 
Post and telecommunications; financial intermediation; insurance and pension 
funding; activities auxiliary to financial intermediation; wholesale trade and 
commission trade; land, water and air transport; supporting and auxiliary transport 
activities. 
 
Personal goods and services (PGS): 
Food and beverages; textiles; wearing; leather; wood and related; pulp and paper; 
printing and publishing; furniture; recycling; sales, maintenance and repair of motor 
vehicles; retail trade and repair of personal and household goods; hotels and 
restaurants. 
 
Because of the central position of natural resource exploitation in the Norwegian economy, I 
chose to present the ”agriculture, forestry and fishing” and “mining and quarrying” sectors in 
addition to the four groups of the taxonomy.  
	   
 
 
